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RESOLVING POLITICAL QUESTIONS INTO 
JUDICIAL QUESTIONS: TOCQUEVILLE'S 
THESIS REVISITED 
Mark A. Graber* 
Americans throughout the Jacksonian era bitterly disputed 
the proper use of the President's veto power.Whigs insisted that 
Democratic Presidents were abusing an authority to reject legis-
lation originally intended to be confined largely to unconstitu-
tional measures." The powers of Congress are paralyzed," Henry 
Clay complained, "by frequent and an extraordinary exercise of 
the executive veto, not anticipated by the founders of the consti-
tution, and not practiced by any of the predecessors" of Andrew 
Jackson. 1 Democrats insisted Jacksonian Presidents were acting 
well within their Article II powers when preventing from becom-
ing law bills incorporating a new national bank and funding in-
ternal improvements. The veto power, future president James 
Buchanan informed Congress, "is a mere power to arrest hasty 
and inconsiderate changes, until the voice of the people, who are 
alike the masters of Senators, Representatives and President, 
shall be heard."2 President Jackson was censured and President 
John Tyler nearly impeached in part over controversies arising 
out of their exercise of the veto.3 
The federal judiciary was the only branch of the national 
government whose members refrained from expressing official 
opinions on the proper constitutional use of the veto power. 
Many Supreme Court justices had strong personal opinions on 
that issue. Chief Justice Taney while Attorney General helped 
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I. 16 REG. DEB. 59 (1833). 
2. CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 2d Sess. App. 141 (1842). 
3. These controversies are discussed at length in DAVID P. CURRIE, THE 
CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: DEMOCRATS AND WHIGS, 1829-1861 185-201 (2005); 
Gerard N. Magliocca, Veto! The Jacksonian Revolution in Constitutional Law, 78 NEB L. 
REV. 205 (1999). 
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draft Jackson's message vetoing the bill rechartering the national 
bank. Levi Woodbury when in Congress vigorously defended 
Tyler's aggressive use of the veto power.4 Nevertheless, the nu-
merous political and constitutional questions raised by the way 
Jacksonian presidents wielded the veto power were never re-
solved into judicial questions. No federal justice ever expressed 
an official judicial opinion on the constitutionality of pocket ve-
toes or on whether the veto power could be constitutionally ex-
ercised only when rejecting unconstitutional legislation. Consti-
tutional questions associated with the veto in Jacksonian 
America were resolved entirely by nonjudicial processes. 
These debates over presidential power in antebellum Amer-
ica belie Tocqueville's famous assertion, "[s]carcely any political 
question arises in the United States that is not resolved, sooner 
or later, into a judicial question."5 The more accurate assertion 
when Tocqueville wrote is, "scarcely any national political ques-
tion" arose that was "resolved into a judicial question." With the 
exception of slavery, the prominent political questions that 
dominated national politics during the 1830s, 1840s, and 1850s 
did not become federal judicial questions. Federal courts during 
the three decades before the Civil War resolved only a very 
small percentage of the national political controversies that ex-
cited Jacksonian America. 
The remarkably truncated agenda of the late Marshall and 
Taney Courts is only partly explained by the Jacksonian failure 
to resolve some political questions into legal or constitutional 
questions. Henry Clay and other Whigs consistently stated their 
objections to Jacksonian uses of the veto power in constitutional 
terms. American System proposals were widely understood as 
raising fundamental constitutional questions. Whigs claimed that 
the Constitution empowered the national government to incor-
porate a national bank, fund internal improvements, impose pro-
tective tariffs, and distribute surplus revenue to the states. Jack-
sonian Democrats insisted that such measures were 
unconstitutional. Nevertheless, majorities on the Taney Court 
refrained from ruling on the constitutionality of any major 
American System proposal. During the three decades before the 
Civil War, the official position of the Supreme Court on the veto 
power, on the national bank, and on the vast majority of political 
4. CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 2nd Sess. App. 157-64 (1842). 
5. 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 280 (Phillips Bradley 
ed., 1945). 
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questions not directly concerned with slavery was, "No com-
ment." 
This article explores the relationships between national po-
litical questions and national judicial questions during the second 
party system and, to a lesser extent, the present. Part I elabo-
rates the meaning of Tocqueville's thesis. Both Tocqueville and 
those who have quoted him believed that throughout American 
history, whether from 1787 to 1835 or from 1787 to 2004, most 
national political questions have been resolved into judicial 
questions adjudicated by the Supreme Court of the United 
States. Part II details appropriate tests for Tocqueville's thesis. 
The main measure compares the issues discussed in national 
party platforms before the Civil War and the issues adjudicated 
by the Supreme Court during that period. Part III performs that 
test, finding Tocqueville's thesis wanting. Most national political 
questions that excited Jacksonians were not resolved into na-
tional judicial questions. Part IV explains why most political and 
constitutional questions in Jacksonian America were not re-
solved into judicial questions. That section then details both con-
tinuities and discontinuities with present judicial practice. Most 
political questions that have arisen at the turn of the twenty-first 
century are still not resolved into judicial questions because they 
are not first resolved into constitutional questions. Changes in 
legislative activity, support services for litigation, and legislative 
support for constitutional litigation, however, explain why con-
stitutional questions that arise at the turn of the twenty-first cen-
tury are far more likely than constitutional questions that arose 
in Tocqueville's time to be resolved into judicial questions. 
Unthinking citation of Tocqueville has distorted constitu-
tional scholarship in law, history and political science. Seduced 
in part by Democracy in America and in part by the rhetoric of 
judicial supremacy, constitutional history in the United States 
has largely been the history of Supreme Court. This history ig-
nores the constitutional debates over the American system, over 
national expansion, and over the veto power that sharply divided 
Americans during the decades before the Civil War. The Su-
preme Court Reporter does not even provide a complete guide to 
the constitutional debates over slavery. The Tocquevillean para-
digm also presents the transformation of political questions into 
judicial questions as a fairly automatic process. The actual proc-
esses are more complicated and not automatic. Most political 
questions in Jacksonian America were not resolved into consti-
tutional questions. Most constitutional questions were not re-
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solved into judicial questions. Only by discarding Tocqueville's 
thesis will scholars be able to explore what must happen for a 
political question to become a constitutional question and a con-
stitutional question to become a judicial question. 
The constant citation of Tocqueville's thesis fares only 
slightly better as a description of national constitutional politics 
at the dawn of the twenty-first century than as a description of 
national constitutional politics in the middle of the nineteenth 
century. The Supreme Court of the United States currently re-
solves more national political questions than did the Marshall or 
Taney Courts. Still, examination of the Democratic and Repub-
lican Party Platforms for the 2000 national elections reveals nu-
merous political questions that have not been resolved into con-
stitutional questions. Several important contemporary constitutional 
questions have not been resolved into judicial questions. These mat-
ters include whether President Bush could order an invasion of 
Iraq in the absence of a declaration of war6 and whether Presi-
dent Clinton committed an impeachable offense when he lied 
under oath about his sexual activity. 7 Unless scholars abandon 
Tocqueville's thesis, future generations may look at Supreme 
Court opinions and conclude that federalism limitations on the 
commerce power8 raised the most important constitutional ques-
tions Americans debated at the turn of the twenty-first century. 
I. TOCQUEVILLE'S THESIS 
Tocqueville's thesis is constantly cited and rarely analyzed. 
His "famous observation" that "[ s ]carcely any political question 
arises in the United States that is not resolved, sooner or later, 
into a judicial question," commentators note, "has been repeated 
so often that is has become part of our nationallore."9 These rit-
ual incantations are rarely accompanied by close textual analysis 
of Democracy in America exploring what Tocqueville meant 
when he claimed that little difference existed in the United 
6. See generally JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY: CONSTITUTIONAL 
LESSONS OF VIETNAM AND ITS AFTERMATH (1993). 
7. See Richard Posner, Dworkin, Polemics, and the Clinton Impeachment Contro-
versy, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 1023 (2000); Ronald Dworkin, Philosophy & Monica Lewinsky, 
N.Y. REV., March 9, 2000, at 46 vol47 no. 4. 
8. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 
514 u.s. 549 (1995). 
9. Paul Schiff Berman, Cyberspace and the State Action Debate: The Cultural 
Value of Applying Constillltional Norms to Private Regulation, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 1263, 
1291 (2000). 
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States between political and judicial agendas. The absence of se-
rious exegesis raises the possibility that what Tocqueville meant 
in 1835 is not what contemporaries mean when they quote him 
in 2004. If Tocqueville's thesis plainly misdescribes the Jackson-
ian political universe, the fault may lie in how that thesis has 
been interpreted, not in Tocqueville. 
More thorough examination of Democracy in America and 
Tocqueville's sources alleviates concerns that misinterpretation 
or misappropriation has taken place. While marginal differences 
no doubt exist, Tocqueville and the commentators who quote 
him agree on two fundamental points. First, the tendency for po-
litical questions to become judicial questions is a permanent fea-
ture of American politics, an accurate description of constitu-
tional politics throughout American history. Second, national 
politics is particularly subject to the tendency for political ques-
tions to be resolved into judicial questions. The Supreme Court 
of the United States, Tocqueville and contemporary Tocquevil-
leans agree, has always resolved the vast majority of national po-
litical questions that excite American political actors. 
Democracy in America maintains that the tendency for po-
litical questions to become judicial questions is an enduring fea-
ture of the American regime. "Armed with the power of deter-
mining the laws to be unconstitutional," Tocqueville wrote, "the 
American magistrate perpetually interferes in political affairs. "10 
He insisted that courts have "immense political influence" be-
cause "few laws can escape the searching analysis of the judicial 
power for any length of time" (emphasis added).JI Tocqueville 
worried that Jacksonians might curb what he believed to be de-
sirable political and legal practice. He criticized the "secret ten-
dency to diminish judicial power" in several states. 12 Neverthe-
less, Democracy in America regarded judicial power as a 
previously well-established practice that might soon be subjected 
to political attack. Tocqueville worried about the future, but 
thought that from 1789 until 1835, most political questions in the 
United States had been resolved into judicial questions. 
The Supreme Court of the United States was the primary 
subject of these references to the judiciary. Tocqueville when 
writing about judicial power relied almost entirely on secondary 
sources discussing the federal judiciary and Constitution of the 
10. TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 5, at 279 (emphasis added). 
II. !d. at 101 (emphasis added). 
12. !d. at 279. 
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United States. He read The Federalist Papers, which included 
Hamilton's famous defense of judicial review; Joseph Story's 
Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, a work 
that celebrated federal judicial power; and the sections in James 
Kent's Commentaries on American Law devoted to the Constitu-
tion of the United States. Tocqueville did not read material on 
state courts, examine judicial interpretation of state constitu-
tions, or have any extensive first-hand experience with state con-
stitutionallitigation.13 
A less famous passage in Democracy in America more pro-
lixly asserts that virtually all national political questions in the 
United States are resolved into national judicial questions adju-
dicated by the Supreme Court of the United States. "The peace, 
the prosperity, and the very existence of the Union," Tocqueville 
wrote, 
are vested in the hands of seven Federal judges. Without them 
the Constitution would be a dead letter: the executive appeals 
to them for assistance against the encroachments of the legis-
lative power; the legislature demands their protection against 
the assaults of the executive; they defend the Union from the 
disobedience of the states, the states from the exaggerated 
claims of the Union, the public interest against private inter-
ests, and the conservative spirit of stability against the fickle-
fd Th . . 14 ness o emocracy. etr power 1s enormous .... 
Tocqueville thought state courts were powerful institutions and 
discussed their power in Democracy in America.15 Still, the tex-
tual and extra-textual evidence clearly indicates that Toc-
queville's thesis primarily referred to the Supreme Court of the 
United States, that he thought the justices on that tribunal had 
their say on the vast majority of political questions that arose in 
antebellum America. 
Contemporary commentators think Tocqueville correctly 
described constitutional politics in the Jacksonian era and 
throughout American history. Citing and quoting Democracy in 
America, scholars declare, "our ~olitical controversies inevitably 
turn into legal controversies." 6 Ruth Gavison states, Toe-
13. See ANDRE JARDIN, TOCQUEVILLE: A BIOGRAPHY 201-02 (Lydia Davis & 
Robert Hemenway trans., 1988). 
14. TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 5, at 151. 
15. See id. at 98-105. 
16. Stephen R. Shapiro, Commentary-Constitutional Issues, 1998 ANN. SURV. AM. 
LAW 223, 223 (emphasis added); see Jane C. Murphy, Lawyering for Social Change: The 
Power of the narrative in Domestic Violence Law Reform, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1243, 
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queville's thesis highlights "one of the defining marks of the 
American political community." 17 Although most citations to 
Tocqueville support observations about constitutional politics at 
the turn of the twenty-first century, commentators assume politi-
cal questions have always been resolved into judicial questions. 
The consensus view is that Tocqueville's thesis "remains accu-
rate. " 18 "The openness of our judicial system" to political ques-
tions, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor asserts, "is as true today as 
it was in 1835 when Alexis de Tocqueville wrote." 19 R. Kent 
Newmyer claims that Tocqueville's thesis predates Jacksonian 
America. "Long before Tocqueville said it," he writes, "[John] 
Marshall realized that in America everlo major political ques-
tion ... turns into a constitutional one." ° Commentators some-
times note that Tocqueville's thesis is even a more accurate ac-
count of contemporary judicial politics,21 but no one suggests his 
thesis was inaccurate when made or fails to describe any period 
in American history. 
Contemporary Tocquevilleans further agree that Toc-
queville correctly described the agenda of the Supreme Court of 
the United States. Lawrence Baum is one of many scholars who 
quotes Tocqueville when explaining how, "[t]hrough its individ-
ual decisions and lines of decisions, the Supreme Court contrib-
utes a great deal to government policy."22 Tocqueville's observa-
tion is frequently cited as supporting claims about other courts. 
Still, commentators on the Supreme Court believe that institu-
tion is the primary beneficiary of the tendency in the United 
States for political questions to be resolved into judicial ques-
tions. 
1248 (1993). 
17. Ruth Gavison, Holmes's Heritage: Living Greatly in the Law, 78 B.U. L. REV. 
843, 869 (1998). 
18. Berman, supra note 9, at 1291 (emphasis added); Thomas D. Rose, Jr., Litiga-
tion, Alternatives and Accommodation: Background Paper, 1989 DUKE L.J. 824, 832. 
19. Sandra Day O'Connor, Courthouse Dedication: Justice O'Connor Reflects on 
Arizona's Judiciary, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 7 (2001); see ROBERT A. CARP & RONALD 
STIDHAM, JUDICIAL PROCESS IN AMERICA 14 (1990). 
20. R. KENT NEWMYER, JOHN MARSHALL AND THE HEROIC AGE OF THE 
SUPREME COURT 378 (2001). 
21. See, e.g., Michael W. Bowers, Public Financing of Judicial Campaigns: Practices 
and Prospects, 4 NEV. L.J. 107 (2003). 
22 .. LAWRENCE BAUM, THE SUPREME COURT 6 (6th ed. 1998). For examples of 
other citatiOns of Tocqueville with specific reference to the Supreme Court of the United 
States, see LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 46 (1998); 
DAVID O'BRIEN, STORM CENTER: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS 182 
(5th ed. 2000). 
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The grounds for Tocqueville's thesis suggest the possible 
need for revision. Tocqueville relied heavily on Story and Kent. 
Both jurists were Whigs, who had political reasons for promoting 
a strong judicial presence in American political life. Americans 
at the turn of the twenty-first century rely heavily on Toc-
queville. No one has actually compared national political and na-
tional judicial questions at the time Tocqueville was writing to 
see whether his claims were correct or whether Tocqueville un-
intentionally passed on Whig propaganda. 
II. TESTING TOCQUEVILLE 
A. PRESENT FAILINGS AND BETTER STANDARDS 
Tocqueville's claim that political questions in the United 
States invariably become judicial questions is more often as-
sumed than tested. The most common practice is simply to de-
clare without supporting argument that "[a]s a policymaker, the 
Court is involved in most issues affecting society."23 At most, the 
obligatory reference to Tocqueville is supplemented by a list of 
political questions that have been resolved into judicial ques-
tions. Jeffrey Segal and Harold Spaeth merely note that "[f]rom 
a woman's control of her own body to the Vietnam war and from 
desegregation of schools to drunken drivers, it is hard to imagine 
a fact of American existence that has not been subjected to con-
stitutional scrutiny."24 Any cursory glance at the numerous issues 
courts have resolved throughout history apparently obviates the 
need for more rigorous examination of Tocqueville's thesis. 
Listing issues the Supreme Court has decided, however im-
pressive and lengthy the list, does not adequately test Toc-
queville's claim that the political and judicial agendas in the 
United States are nearly identical. Some independent measure 
of important political questions is needed to test whether virtu-
ally all political questions that excite the polity are resolved into 
judicial questions or only the many political questions that inter-
est judges, lawyers, and persons who study courts. Other con-
cerns must also be addressed when constructing a fair test of 
23. RICHARD L. PACELLE, JR., THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE SUPREME 
COURT'S AGENDA: FROM THE NEW DEAL To THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION 2 
(1991 ). 
24. JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE 
ATTITUDINAL MODEL 4 (1993) (quoting Bertha Wilson, The Meaning of a Constitution, 
71 JUDICATURE 334 (1988)). 
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Tocqueville's thesis. Political controversies and judicial decisions 
must have the temporal and causal relationship necessary to en-
sure that the Justices are resolving a live political controversy 
rather than announcing the terms under which an old political 
controversy was settled by elected officials. The political ques-
tion must be resolved by courts reasonable people might think 
capable of settling the political controversy as opposed to merely 
handing down a decision in favor of a private litigant. Finally, 
Tocqueville's thesis is supported only to the extent that judicial 
answers are responsive to the full dimension of the political 
question and do not merely resolve minor aspects of the underly-
ing political controversy. 
1. Independent Measure of Political Questions. Scholars 
comparing legal and political agendas should obviously measure 
political and judicial agendas separately. Courts may appear to 
be interfering in all dimensions of political life only when judicial 
agendas are not compared with far broader political agendas. 
Persons who make their living studying courts may have some 
understandable tendency to think that the issues courts resolve 
are particularly important. If law,vers have distinctive opinions 
on the merits of various issues,2 then good reason exists for 
thinking that judges, lawyers, and public law scholars have dis-
tinctive opinions on the salience of various issues. A good corre-
lation is likely to exist between the issues adjudicated by the 
Rehnquist Court and the issues most Rehnquist Court watchers 
think are particularly important. Persons who do not study legal 
processes for a living may have different political priorities. The 
issues that most excite scholars whose research focuses on courts 
may not be the issues that most excite scholars whose research 
focuses on nuclear proliferation, a political question that for the 
most part has not been resolved into a judicial question, or the 
issues that most excite a general public that displays little inter-
est in or knowledge about the Supreme Court.26 
2. Relationship between Political Question and Judicial De-
cision. Political questions are resolved into judicial questions 
only when judicial decisions are handed down before the politi-
cal controversy is settled. Tocqueville may have written, 
"scarcely a political question arises in the United States that is 
25. Walter F. Murphy & Joseph Tanenhaus, Publicity, Public Opinion, and the 
Court, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 985, 995-99 (1990). 
26. See id. at 990, 995-96; Gregory A. Caldeira, Courts and Public Opinion, in THE 
AMERICAN COURTS: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 303-04 (John B. Gates & Charles John-
son eds., 1991). 
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not, sooner or later, resolved into a judicial question," but his 
famous observation was made when noting the extraordinary 
impact of the judiciary on American public life. Timing matters, 
as Tocqueville recognized when he declared, "few laws can es-
cape the searching analysis of the judicial power for any length of 
time."27 Contemporary commentators who quote Tocqueville 
share his assessment that "the judge is one of the most important 
political powers in the United States."28 Tocquevilleans celebrat-
ing judicial power get no credit when judicial decisions occur 
significantly "later," merely reaffirming constitutional settle-
ments made decades or a century earlier in nonjudicial forums. 
That federal circuit courts during the Adams administration sus-
tained the Alien and Sedition Acts supports Tocqueville's the-
sis.Z9 That the Warren Court in 1964 asserted that those meas-
ures were unconstitutional does not.30 
"Sooner" is more complicated. Some political questions re-
solved into judicial questions at one point in history are not re-
solved into judicial questions at later points. The Supreme Court 
handed down two very important decisions on national banking 
policy during the first party system/1 but no decision on national 
banking policy during the second party system even though 
banking and currency issues were arguably the most controver-
sial political questions that arose during the first half of the Jack-
sonian Era. Tocquevilleans need not require courts to repeat 
themselves. Still, the influence of previous judicial decisions on 
subsequent political controversies cannot be taken for granted. 
Two conditions must be met for Tocqueville's thesis to be 
satisfied by a judicial decision that predates a political contro-
versy or a particular manifestation of a political controversy. 
First, general agreement existed that the previous decision re-
mained good law. Persons who disagreed with the past judicial 
decision did not relitigate the issue because they recognized that 
the Justices would reaffirm that precedent. Opponents of judicial 
review32 know they will be laughed out of court (and possibly the 
legal profession) should they ask the Rehnquist Court to recon-
27. TOCQUEVJLLE, supra note 5, at 101 (emphasis added). 
28. SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 24, at 333. 
29. See United States v. Callender, 25 F. Cas. 239 (C.C.D. Va. 1800); Case of Lyon, 
15 F. Cas. 1183 (C.C.D. Vt. 1798). 
30. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 276 (1964). 
31. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819); Osborn v. Bank of the 
United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824). 
32. See MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 
175 (1999). 
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sider the 1803 decision in Marbury v. Madison33 holding that 
courts have the power to declare federal laws unconstitutional. 
Second, elected officials were acting consistently with previous 
judicial rulings. Persons who favored the past judicial decision 
had no political reason to ask courts to reaffirm that precedent. 
Proponents of ur.regulated abortion do not litigate in states that 
never regulate abortion (and do fund abortions for poor 
women). When precedents may no longer be good judicial law 
or are being flouted by elected officials, the previous resolution 
of a political question into a judicial question does not explain 
the subsequent failure of the political question to be resolved 
again into a judicial question. If opponents of the original deci-
sion believe that Justices will not respect that precedent, then 
anticipated reactions based on past decisions do not explain their 
failure to relitigate the issue. If proponents of the original deci-
sion are suffering legislative defeats, they have reason to resolve 
that political question into a judicial question. Their failure to do 
so raises questions about the extent to which the previous judi-
cial decisions influenced subsequent public policy. 
3. Authority. A fair test of Tocqueville's thesis interprets 
"judicial" no more literally than "sooner or later." The letter of 
Tocqueville's claim is satisfied whenever any court is asked to 
resolve some political dispute. No one would think that repro-
ductive choice in the United States was resolved into a judicial 
issue, however, had the only legal decision on abortion been 
made by a small claims court outside of Des Moines. Toc-
queville's thesis describes practice only when political questions 
are resolved by courts thought capable of influencing public pol-
icy, and not merely capable of resolving a particular dispute be-
tween two private parties. National political questions are re-
solved into national judicial questions only when adjudicated by 
the Supreme Court, by numerous lower federal courts, or by the 
highest courts in influential states. 
The emphasis on the political power of the judge suggests 
that scholars testing Tocqueville's thesis should consider 
whether judicial resolution actually influenced the political con-
troversy. A very lively debate exists in political science over 
whether judicial decisions have a substantial impact on public 
policy.34 Still, the present focus is on the judicial agenda, not ju-
33. 5 U.S. (3 Cranch.) 137 (1803). 
34. See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING 
ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991); MICHAEL W. MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK: PAY 
EQU)TY AND THE POLITICS OF LEGAL MOBILIZATION (1994). 
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dicial efficacy. For present purposes, Tocqueville's thesis on the 
resolution of political questions into judicial questions is sup-
ported whenever courts make serious attempts to influence pub-
lic policy, even when those attempts fail. 
4. Completeness. Tests of Tocqueville's thesis should de-
termine how completely a political question has been resolved 
into a judicial question. That the Supreme Court hands down a 
ruling on foreign policy hardly entails that all foreign policy 
questions have been resolved into judicial questions. Sometimes, 
a judicial decision or series of judicial decisions completely cover 
a political question. Most political questions associated with 
abortion have over the past three decades been resolved into ju-
dicial questions.35 The Supreme Court's decision in Dames & 
Moore v. Regan36 affirming the power of the president to freeze 
Iranian assets during the hostage crisis of 1980, by comparison, 
did not resolve other political questions associated with the hos-
tage crisis, such as whether the United States should have at-
tempted a military rescue. The precise scope of a particular deci-
sion or series of decisions is often unclear. Still, general 
agreement exists on rough contours. Whether Brown v. Board of 
Education37 standing alone resolved all questions about segrega-
tion or race is an open question. No one thinks Brown resolved 
all political questions associated with education. 
The completeness criteria highlights an important difference 
between judicial decisions declaring federal practices unconstitu-
tional and most judicial decisions declaring a practice constitu-
tional. Judicial decisions declaring a federal law unconstitutional 
fully resolve all political questions directly concerned with that 
particular law. Dred Scott v. Sandford38 bluntly held that Con-
gress could not ban slavery in the territories. The primary politi-
cal questions associated with slavery in the territories remaining 
open after that decision concerned judicial supremacy and 
whether Congress had a constitutional obligation to pass a slave 
code for the territories. Should political actors comply with Dred 
Scott in the case before the court?39 To what extent should the 
35. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Hill v. 
Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000); Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000). 
36. 453 u.s. 654 (1981 ). 
37. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
38. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856). 
39. Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1858), might be interpreted as hold-
ing that elected officials were obligated to obey federal judicial rulings. Of course, that 
case left open whether elected officials were obligated to obey a federal judicial ruling 
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rule of Dred Scott guide future legislative and executive decision 
making?40 Virtually all judicial decisions declaring a federal 
practice constitutional merely assert that federal actors are con-
stitutionally authorized to choose whether to adopt a particular 
policy. Prigg v. Pennsylvania41 held that Congress had the power 
to pass a fugitive slave law. That decision left unresolved such 
political questions as whether Congress should pass a fugitive 
slave law, whether Congress was constitutionally obligated to 
pass a fugitive slave law, and whether that fugitive slave law 
should be identical to either the statutes passed in 1793 or 1850. 
Judicial decisions sustaining federal practices merely resolve po-
litical questions concerned with whether power exists to engage 
in a practice, but not political questions concerned with whether 
engaging in that practice is desirable or mandatory. Political 
questions associated with fugitive slave law would have been 
fully resolved into judicial questions only if the Supreme Court 
determined whether Congress was constitutionally obligated to 
pass fugitive slave laws, whether such laws were good public pol-
icy, and what the content of the best fugitive slave law would be. 
Whether completeness requires tests of Tocqueville's thesis 
to distinguish between statutory and constitutional decisions is 
not clear. Democracy in America emphasized constitutional de-
cisions. Tocqueville highlighted "the power vested in the Ameri-
can courts of justice of pronouncing a statute to be unconstitu-
tional."42 "Armed with the power of declaring the law to be 
unconstitutional," Democracy in America opines, "the American 
magistrate perpetually interferes in political affairs."43 Unlike 
constitutional decisions, statutory decisions leave open the un-
derlying constitutional question. Elected officials remain free to 
pass a law embodying the policy that the court rejected. Con-
temporary scholars, however, realize that many statutory deci-
sions bear a strong resemblance to constitutional decisions. Judi-
cial interpretations of statutes, while not as difficult to overturn 
legislatively as constitutional decisions, still require in practice 
large or multiple legislative majorities to reverse.44 Moreover, 
holding that elected officials were obligated to obey federal judicial rulings. Cf Cooper v. 
Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958). 
40. Abraham Lincoln, Mr. Lincoln's Speech, Sixth Joint Debate, October 13, 1858, 
in THE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES OF 1858 255 (Robert W. Johannsen ed., 1965). 
41. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842). 
42. TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 5, at 103. 
43. Id, at 279. 
44. See GLENDON A. SCHUBERT, CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS: THE POLITICAL 
BEHAVIOR OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL POLICIES THAT 
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Congress frequently writes statutes with vague language for the 
very purpose of facilitating judicial policymaking.45 Statutory in-
terpretation in these circumstances is practically as final as con-
stitutional interpretation, Finally, the line between statutory and 
constitutional decisions is not always clear. Antebellum courts, 
in particular, frequently misinterpreted federal statutes in order 
to avoid declaring them unconstitutional.46 No perfect resolution 
of the difficulties raised by statutory cases seems possible. Still, 
scholars exploring the extent to which political questions are re-
solved into judicial questions should be sensitive to cases where 
the judiciary is largely applying clear legislative language to a 
fact situation, and instances where the judges are more clearly 
establishing public policy that simple majorities in other 
branches of the national government may not be able or want to 
overturn. 
B. THE TEST 
Tocqueville's thesis is best tested by determining which im-
portant national political issues were resolved by the Supreme 
Court while those political questions were still being debated po-
litically. Limited to Jacksonian America, the appropriate com-
parison contrasts the national political agenda and the national 
judicial agenda from 1828 to 1860. Cases decided before 1828 
should be included to determine whether some Jacksonian po-
litical questions were not resolved into judicial questions during 
the second party system primarily because they had previously 
been resolved into judicial questions during the first party sys-
tem. Such decisions as McCulloch v. Maryland and Gibbons v. 
Ogden might explain why the late Marshall and Taney Courts 
were not called on to resolve numerous political questions asso-
ciated with federal power to promote economic development. 
1. The Political Questions. The most important national po-
litical questions during the Jacksonian era were determined by 
examining the major and minor party platforms published during 
the three decades before the Civil War.47 These party platforms 
were supplemented by presidential messages issued from 1828 
THEY MAKE (1960). 
45. See GEORGE l. LOVELL, LEGISLATIVE DEFERRALS: STATUTORY AMBIGUITY, 
JUDICIAL POWER AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2003). 
46. See, e.g., Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66 (1860); Mossman v. Hig-
ginson, 4 U.S. (2 Cranch) 12 (1800). 
47. See 1 NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS, at 1-33 (Donald Bruce Johnson ed., 
1978). 
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until 1860,48 the primary and secondary sources on presidential 
elections held between 1828 and 1860 published in the four vol-
ume History of American Presidential Elections ,49 and general 
histories of the Jackson,50 Van Buren,51 Harrison and Tyler,52 
Polk,53 TaJior and Fillmore,54 Pierce,55 and Buchanan56 admini-
strations.5 These supplemental sources confirm that party plat-
forms highlighted the major political questions debated during 
the Jacksonian era, detail numerous facets of those political 
questions, and refer to other national political '\uestions of some 
importance not mentioned in party platforms. 8 Political ques-
tions mentioned only once or twice in primary sources may have 
been of transient importance only. Those issues are worth no-
tice, given that Tocqueville declared that "{sjcarcely any political 
question arises in the United States that is not resolved ... into a 
judicial question." Nevertheless, that an issue is mentioned only 
once in the supplementary sources hardly constitutes geometric 
proof that the matter was of any importance or more important 
than issues not mentioned. 
The analysis below uses a very broad, arguably too broad, 
conception of "political question" when examining Tocqueville's 
thesis. All controversies over the merits and behavior of public 
officials or candidates for public office, the processes by which 
public policies were made, and the substance of any governmen-
tal decision are considered political questions. Political questions 
48. See 2-5 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE 
PRESIDENTS 1789-1897 (James D. Richardson ed., 1896). 
49. See THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS (Arthur M. 
Schlesinger, Jr., & Fred L. Israel eds., 1971). 
50. See DONALD B. COLE, THE PRESIDENCY OF ANDREW JACKSON (1993). 
51. See MAJOR L. WILSON, THE PRESIDENCY OF MARTIN VAN BUREN (1984). 
52. See NORMA LOIS PETERSON, THE PRESIDENCIES OF WILLIAM HENRY 
HARRISON & JOHN TYLER (1989). 
53. See PAUL H. BERGERON, THE PRESIDENCY OF JAMES K. POLK (1987). 
54. See ELBERT B. SMITH, THE PRESIDENCIES OF ZACHARY TAYLOR & 
MILLIARD FILLMORE (1988). 
55. See LARRY GARA, THE PRESIDENCY OF FRANKLIN PIERCE (1991). 
56. See ELBERT B. SMITH, THE PRESIDENCY OF JAMES BUCHANAN (1975). 
57. No different conclusions would have been reached had other general histories 
of Jacksonian America been used. See, e.g., MICHAEL F. HOLT, THE RISE AND FALL OF 
THE AMERICAN WHIG PARTY: JACKSONIAN POLITICS AND THE ONSET OF THE CiVIL 
WAR (1999); DANIEL FELLER, THE JACKSONIAN PROMISE: AMERICA 1815-1840 (1995). 
Prominent works on judicial review before the Civil War were not used to determine 
the most important political issues during the Jacksonian Era. Studies that focus primar-
ily on the Supreme Court or particular Supreme Court cases may understandably exag-
gerate the impo.rtance of the author's subject. For similar reasons, works on specific 
Jacksoman pohc1es were not used to establish that those policies were particular impor-
tant. 
58. All issues mentioned below were discussed in at least one of these sources. 
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include such matters as the appropriate use of the presidential 
veto, whether Congress could ban slavery in the District of Co-
lumbia, whether the federal government was authorized to build 
post roads, whether the United States should have declared war 
against Mexico in 1845, whether a constitutional amendment 
changing the presidential election system should have been 
adopted after the election of 1828, whether the Whigs should 
have run a single candidate in 1836, and whether Presidents 
should have danced the polka in public. Several of these issues 
may seem inappropriate given that everyone knows that Justices 
do not determine when Congress should declare war, whether 
Americans should pass a constitutional amendment, what nomi-
nation strategies political parties should adopt, and how or 
where the President should dance. These issues are included 
partly because Tocqueville and those who quote him assert 
"scarcely any political question" without explicit qualification. 
More significantly, attempts at qualification are more difficult 
than appear and obscure important features of American judicial 
politics. 
Americans throughout history have turned to courts to re-
solve an impressive array of political questions. Hardly any kind 
of political question has enjoyed complete immunity from this 
litigious imperative. For virtually every political question that 
was not resolved into a judicial question at one point in Ameri-
can history, an analogous political question arose at some other 
time that was resolved into a legal question. Consider sex scan-
dals involving national figures. Such incidents frequently raise 
important political questions. Washingtonians during President 
Andrew Jackson's first years in office vigorously disputed 
whether Margaret ("Peggy") O'Neal Eaton, when married to 
her first husband, John Timberlake, had an affair with her sec-
ond husband, Jackson's friend, political confidante, and first sec-
retary of war, John Eaton. The political consequences of the 
"Petticoat affair" included the collapse of Jackson's first cabinet, 
Jackson's alienation from his first vice-president, John C. Cal-
houn, and Jackson's decision to make Martin van Buren his heir 
apparent. 59 Issues concerning Peggy Eaton's virtue were dis-
cussed in numerous political forums and attracted the attention 
of most prominent political actors in Jacksonian America. 
59. See JOHN F. MARSZALEK, THE PETTICOAT AFFAIR: MANNERS, MUTINY, AND 
SEX I:-! ANDREW JACKSON'S WHITE HOUSE (1997). 
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Although no issue arising out of that affair ever became the 
subject of litigation, President Bill Clinton was not as lucky. The 
sex scandals of his administration were resolved into political, 
legal, and judicial questions. His affair with Monica Lewinsky 
was investigated by a special prosecutor. His encounter with 
Paula Jones resulted in a lawsuit that eventually reached the Su-
preme Court of the United States.60 Constitutional amendments 
provide a less salacious example of political questions resolved 
into judicial questions at some times, but not others. Debate 
over whether the first eighteen amendments were constitution-
ally legitimate took place entirely outside the courtroom. Oppo-
nents of women's suffrage resolved the legitimacy of the Nine-
teenth Amendment into a judicial question. Whether granting 
women the vote was an unlawful constitutional amendment was 
adjudicated, adversely, by the Supreme Court of the United 
States.61 
Qualifying Tocqueville's thesis fails. Democracy in America 
loses its bite if interpreted as asserting only that those political 
questions which also raise legal issues are routinely resolved into 
judicial questions. Justices exercise substantial political power 
only if most political questions (of a certain type) are resolved 
into legal questions. Narrowing Tocqueville's thesis to the claim 
that policy questions in the United States are routinely resolved 
into judicial questions is problematic. Numerous policy questions 
are rarely resolved into judicial questions. Whether to declare 
war is a policy question, as is whether to amend the constitution 
to ban flag burning. Prominent nonpolicy questions are some-
times resolved into judicial questions. Who won the presidential 
election of 2000 is not normally considered a policy question, yet 
commentators routinely speak of Bush v. Gore62 as playing a ma-
jor role in determining who took the oath of office in 2001. 
The logic of much judicial behaviorialism in political science 
provides additional reasons for initially relying on a very broad 
conception of "political question" when testing Tocqueville's 
thesis. The leading behavioral study of judicial decisionmaking 
declares "American judges have ... virtually untrammeled poli-
cymaking authority" and that the individual justices individual 
60. See Clinton v. New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998). 
61. See Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130 (1922); Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U.S. 126 
(1922). For an infamous claim that the justices should have declared the Fifteenth 
Amendment unconstitutional, see Arthur W. Machen, Jr., Is the Fifteenth Amendment 
Void?, 23 HARV. L. REV. 169 (1910). 
62. 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
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policy preferences . . . determine who gets into the Supreme 
Court.6 These assumptions suggest that federal judges consis-
tently determine when the United States goes to war and what 
constitutional amendments should be passed. These are all pol-
icy questions on which most Justices most of the time have fairly 
strong preferences. The central creed of much judicial behavior-
ism, that judicial decisions are made on the basis of judges' po-
litical preferences rather than legal rules, suggests that virtually 
any matter should be grist for the judicial mill. If judges are pri-
mary interested in making good policy, surely they would want 
to determine the outcome of political questions that would affect 
policy, and not simply confine themselves to resolving specific 
policy questions. Jacksonian Justices would more likely influ-
ence the direction of public policy by declaring that the Democ-
rat won the presidential election of 1848 than by separately re-
solving all the policy issues that divided Whigs from Jacksonians. 
Strategic-minded Justices would certainly have intervened in the 
Eaton Affair. Martin Van Buren, perhaps the best political 
strategist of the time, devoted a good deal of time to Mrs. 
Eaton's problems. Given that the Petticoat Affair helped cause 
the breakup of a cabinet and a change in the line of presidential 
secession, one may wonder what a strategic court was saving its 
political capital for. Little in the judicial behavioral literature ex-
plains why Justices should limit themselves to political questions. 
If life tenure gives Justices "virtually untrammeled ... power," 
then the Supreme Court should be arranging blind dates, firing 
football coaches, and judging quilt work whenever five Justices 
feel strongly enough on those subjects. Justice Brennan, after all, 
apparently declared that "five votes can do anything here. "64 
Beginning with a very broad conception of "political ques-
tion" does not dictate concluding with such a conception. If in-
vestigation reveals some political questions are never or hardly 
ever resolved into judicial questions, scholars ought to explain 
why these matters are rarely placed on the judicial agenda. 
Thinking about what common features of presidential polkas 
and party nominations inhibit such political questions from being 
resolved into judicial questions is likely to be more fruitful than 
merely asserting, "These are not the political questions we 
mean." One reason why Tocqueville's thesis may seem attractive 
is that both he and subsequent commentators implicitly define 
63. SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 24, at 7, 192. 
64. EDWARD LAZARUS, CLOSED CHAMBERS: THE RISE, FALL, AND FUTURE OF 
THE MODERN SUPREME COURT 369 (1998). 
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out of existence those political questions that everyone knows 
courts do not resolve. 
2. Judicial Decisions. Reports of all Supreme Court and 
lower federal court decisions were surveyed to discover which 
national political questions mentioned in party platforms or the 
supplemental sources were resolved into judicial questions. The 
Jacksonian era and second party system were clearly over by the 
election of Lincoln, but judicial decisions from 1860 until 1870 
were surveyed to ensure that no case was missed merely because 
the normal time lags associated with litigation prevented a po-
litical question that arose late in the Jacksonian era from being 
resolved into a judicial question until or shortly after the Civil 
War. Rice v. Railroad Co. 65 supports Tocqueville's thesis. That 
1862 decision resolved a congressional debate during the 1850s 
over whether federal land grants to railroads could be repealed. 
Hepburn v. Griswol~6 and the Legal Tender Casei7 are not in-
cluded in this study because the political questions resolved into 
judicial questions in those cases were associated with the meth-
ods used to finance the Civil War, and not the controversies over 
hard money that took place during the 1830s and 1840s. 
III. POLITICAL QUESTIONS TO 
JUDICIAL QUESTIONS 
Comparing political and judicial agendas reveals that 
scarcely any national political question arose in Jacksonian 
America that was resolved into a judicial question adjudicated 
by the Supreme Court of the United States. The Justices did 
hand down decisions on many, not all, of the slavery issues that 
disrupted the second party system. On those questions that di-
vided National Republicans and Whigs from Democrats, the late 
Marshall and early Taney Courts were largely silent. That tribu-
nal did not deliver authoritative opinions on the vast majority of 
issues that from 1828 to 1860 were sufficiently important to be 
included in a major party platform, a minor party platform, a 
presidential message, a political history of a particular presiden-
tial administrations or a political history of a particular presiden-
tial election. Lower federal courts adjudicated a similarly narrow 
range of cases. With the exception of a series of bankruptcy 
cases and several issues related to slavery, both federal district 
65. 66 U.S. (1 Black) 358 (1861). 
66. 75 U.S. 603 (1869). 
67. 78 U.S. 682 (1870). 
504 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 21 :485 
and federal circuit courts had no broader an agenda than the Su-
preme Court. 
Numerous national political questions so excited Americans 
during the Jacksonian era that they were repeatedly highlighted 
in both party platforms and the supplemental sources. Slavery 
was undoubtedly the most important national political question 
in Jacksonian America. Many national disputes directly con-
cerned the South's peculiar institution. Such matters as Kansas 
statehood and secession had little salience independent from 
slavery. Political questions associated with the American System 
or national economic development were debated almost as fer-
vently as slavery. These issues included internal improvements, 
the tariff and the related nullification crisis, federal assumption 
of state debts, the national debt, the national bank, the inde-
pendent treasury,68 the currency, public land policy, the railroad 
to the Pacific, and the postal system. Political questions associ-
ated with ethnocultural issues, although more salient in state 
politics, periodically excited important national controversies. 
National calls for immigration and nationalization restrictions 
during the 1850s were matched by calls for religious freedom. 
Expansion generated intense political controversies concerning 
slavery and national development during the 1840s and 1850s, as 
Americans debated political questions associated with Oregon, 
Texas, and Cuba. Political questions associated with foreign pol-
icy similarly occupied space on the national political agenda. 
J acksonians debated various foreign alliances, whether to sup-
port republican governments and republican revolutions in for-
eign countries, the role of international arbitration, and more 
specific political questions associated with the Mexican War, the 
Monroe Doctrine, Central America, and the Caribbean. The 
place of Native Americans in the Jacksonian regime proved an 
important national political question closely related to national 
expansion, foreign policy, and ethnocultural concerns. Ameri-
cans in the Jacksonian era debated issues associated with the 
staffing of the national government and the new Jacksonian style 
of government. These political questions included the presiden-
tial veto, executive usurpation, the presidential term, direct elec-
tions for more governing officials, and ongoing concerns with po-
litical corruption. Finally, Americans debated such national 
political questions as whether to amend the constitution, issues 
68. For a good discussion of President Van Buren's proposed independent treasury, 
see WILSON, supra note 51. 
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of political morality, political economy, and political sociology, 
and issues generated by social life in Washington. 
Some political questions and particular issues were obvi-
ously more important than others. Many issues had numerous 
components. The railroad to the Pacific raised questions about 
whether Congress should finance that endeavor and, if so, what 
route should be chosen. Fortunately, present purposes do not 
require fine-tuning the categories. That most political questions 
debated between 1828 and 1860 were not resolved into judicial 
questions can be demonstrated by using admittedly very rough 
categories. Whether these categories should be or can be fine-
tuned for other projects awaits those projects. 
A. THE DETAILED SCORECARD 
1. Slavery. The Supreme Court during the second party sys-
tem adjudicated many political controversies associated with 
slavery. The Justices in Scott v. Sandford held that former slaves 
could not become American citizens,69 that Congress could not 
ban slavery in American territories, and that slave states could 
determine whether slave status reattached when a person who 
had been held in slavery "voluntarily" returned from free soil. 
The Justices in Prigg v. Pennsylvania and Ableman v. Booth sus-
tained the power of the federal government to pass fugitive slave 
laws and sustained particular details of the Fugitive Slave Laws 
passed by the federal government in 1793 and 1850, respectively. 
Chief Justice Taney in Kentucky v. Dennison ruled that the na-
tional government could not compel a state government to ex-
tradite persons accused of helping fugitive slaves. Two decades 
previously, the Justices in Groves v. Slaughter70 were asked to 
determine the scope of state and federal power to regulate the 
interstate slave trade. The majority opinion decided the case on 
more narrow grounds, dubiously claiming that Mississippi had 
not yet legally regulated the interstate slave trade. 71 Chief Justice 
Taney and Justice McLean in separate opinions declared that 
slaves were not the sort of commercial good that the federal 
government had the power to regulate. 72 Justice Baldwin's dis-
sent maintained that the federal government could regulate the 
69. Chief Justice Taney on circuit did find that slaves were persons under federal 
criminal law. See United States v. Amy, 24 F. Cas. 792, 810 (C.C.D.Va. 1859) (No. 
14,445). 
70. 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 449 (1841) 
71. See id. at 499-503. 
72. See id. at 508-10 (Taney, C.J., concurring); id. at 504-08 (McLean, J., dissenting). 
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interstate slave trade.73 The Amistad case74 declared that no 
compensation was due a ship engaged in the illegal slave trade 
that was captured and commandeered by its "merchandise." Jus-
tice Wayne in another case indicated that states could bar the 
entry of free persons of color and other "undesirables. "75 
Some questions concerning the federal law of slavery not 
resolved by the Supreme Court were resolved by other tribunals. 
Lower federal courts adjudicated numerous questions concerned 
with federal power to regulate the international slave trade, 
various facets of the fugitive slave law,76 and private filibustering 
efforts to conquer Carribean or Central American nations with 
the goal of eventually making them slave states.77 State courts 
heard numerous cases on the constitutional status of fugitive 
slaves78 and slaves who traveled with their masters to free 
states.79 A state court decision on the status of slaves sojourning 
with their masters in free territory80 might have been reviewed 
by the Supreme Court had the Civil War not intervened. A 
North Carolina state court punished a clergyman for distributing 
an antislavery tract.81 
Other important political questions associated with slavery 
were not resolved into judicial questions. The Supreme Court 
did not decide whether federal postmasters could exclude from 
the mails abolitionist tracts or other materials published by an 
antislavery editor, whether and how Congress could refuse to 
discuss abolitionist petitions, whether Preston Brooks should 
have been disciplined by Congress for caning Charles Sumner, 
whether the United States should have sent representatives to a 
central American conference attended by black delegates from 
Haiti, or whether the free states should have passed laws crimi-
nalizing antislavery speech. The federal bench issued no ruling 
73. See id. at 510-17 (Baldwin, 1., dissenting). 
74. United States v. Libellants and Claimants of the Schooner Amistad, 40 U.S. (15 
Pet.) 518 (1841). 
75. Smith v. Turner, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 428 (1849) (Wayne, 1.) See ROGERS M. 
SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS: CONFLICTING VISIONS OF CITIZENSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY 227 
(1997). 
76. See, e.g., United States v. Hanway, 26 F. Cas. 105 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1851) (No. 15, 
299). 
77. See, e.g., United States v. Quitman, 27 F. Cas. 680 (C.C. E.D. La. 1854) (No. 
16,111). 
78. See, e.g., Sim's Case, 61 Mass. 285 (1851); Jack v. Martin, 12 Wend. 311 (N.Y. 
1834). 
79. See, e.g., Jackson v. Bulloch, 12 Conn. 38 (1837); Commonwealth v. Aves, 35 
Mass. 193 (1836). 
80. See Lemmon v. People, 20 N.Y. 562 (1860). 
81. See State v. Worth, 52 N.C. 488 (1860). 
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on how the United States should have responded when a filibus-
tering expedition led by William Walker temporarily conquered 
Nicaragua, on whether the federal government had to provide 
defense counsel for any federal marshal sued for false imprison-
ment by an alleged fugitive slave, or on whether claimed fugitive 
slaves had a right to a jury trial in the state from which they al-
legedly fled. Federal judges during the Jacksonian era did not 
decide whether southern states could imprison free seamen of 
color.82 No judicial decision discussed whether Congress should 
have banned slavery or the slave trade in the District of Colum-
bia, or could have established a slave code in the territories. No 
judicial decision discussed whether the United States should 
have demanded compensation from Great Britain for freeing 
slaves who while on the Creole mutinied and brought the vessel 
to the West Indies. Federal judges did not decide whether Brit-
ish ships should be given permission to search for slaves on ships 
flying the flag of the United States, or whether Indian peonage 
should be banned in the western territories. No judicial decision 
considered any scheme to colonize freed slaves or on whether 
and how to maintain sectional equilibrium in the Senate. The 
Justices did not adjudicate such issues associated with Kansas 
statehood as the Lecompton Constitution, the English Bill, and 
best nominee for territorial governor. None of the political 
questions associated with the congressional response to and in-
vestigation of John Brown's raid on Harper's Ferry were re-
solved into judicial questions. Americans debated without offi-
cial judicial assistance whether to sign the Quintuple Treaty, the 
Webster-Ashburton Treaty, or any other measure designed to 
suppress slave piracy. The Justices in their official capacity did 
not comment when New Englanders proposed a constitutional 
amendment repealing the three-fifths clause. 
Some, but not all, of the political questions associated with 
efforts to prevent secession and Civil War were resolved into ju-
dicial questions. The Supreme Court's decisions in the Prize 
Cases83 and Texas v. White 84 established that the President could 
respond militarily to secession without contemporaneous legisla-
tive approval and rejected claims that states could unilaterally 
82. That issue was raised in federal circuit courts during the early 1820s. See Elkison 
v. Deliesseline, 8 F. Cas. 493 (C.C.D.S.C. 1823) (No. 4,366). Marshall in 1820 ducked the 
issue. See The Wilson v. United States, 30 F. Cas. 239 (C.C.D. Va. 1820) (No. 17,846). For 
the continued vitality of this issue during the Jacksonian Era in national legislative poli-
tics, see CARL B. SWISHER, THE TANEY PERIOD 1836-1864, at 378-82,392-94 (1974). 
83. 67 U.S. 635 (1862) 
84. 74 U.S. 700 (1868) 
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leave the union. White, however, was decided rather late in the 
day to resolve political questions associated with secession, and 
is probably better conceptualized as only resolving questions as-
sociated with Reconstruction. No judicial decision discussed 
whether President Buchanan should have called a national con-
vention after South Carolina attempted secession, determined 
whether the Congressional Committee of 13 should have made 
decisions by majority or supermajority vote, or helped establish 
the precise status of the ad hoc peace convention presided over 
by former President Tyler. The Supreme Court did not decide 
whether Americans should adopt Robert Toombs' suggestion 
that constitutional amendments be passed guaranteeing slave-
holders rights in all territories, making clear that fugitive slaves 
had no right to a jury trial or habeas corpus, giving a majority of 
slave states a veto on any law relevant to slavery, and giving 
every slave state a veto on any proposed constitutional amend-
ment related to slavery. Federal judges were similarly silent 
when Stephen Douglas proposed that territories be admitted as 
states when and only when they had 50,000 inhabitants, that a 
two-thirds vote of each house be required for any further na-
tional expansion, that blacks neither vote nor hold office, and 
that the federal government purchase land for colonization. No 
judicial decision discussed whether Americans should pass the 
Corwin Amendment or extend the Missouri Compromise line to 
the Pacific on the condition that no new territory be acquired. 
American politicians in the wake of secession debated without 
judicial assistance whether to retain southern forts, resupply 
those forts, or increase the military budget. Justices Nelson and 
Campbell participated actively as private citizens in efforts to 
maintain union in the wake of Lincoln's election.85 No Justice 
participated in any official or semi-official discussion during the 
secession winter aimed at preserving the constitutional order. 
2. National Economic Development. The Supreme Court 
resolved almost none of the major political questions raised by 
the American System and related proposals for national eco-
nomic development. No judicial decision between 1828 and 1860 
considered whether Congress had the power to incorporate a na-
tional bank. No judicial decision considered the merits of any 
particular national bank proposal, most notably the proposal to 
give states one opportunity to reject a branch of the national 
85. See DAVID M. POTIER, LINCOLN AND HIS PARTY IN THE SECESSION CRISIS 
345-49 (1979). 
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bank, or proposed Jacksonian substitutes for the national bank, 
most notably the Independent Treasury and Exchequer. No ju-
dicial decision considered the merits of proposed federal regula-
tions of state banks, most notably proposals to close any bank 
that suspended specie payments and to ban special charters for 
banking corporations. Such political questions as how federal 
funds should be distributed to the states after being removed 
from the national bank, or whether federal policy should favor 
state banks or divorce national institutions from all banks were 
not resolved into judicial questions. The Supreme Court before 
the Civil War did not participate in the debates between hard 
and soft money advocates, or decide how much and what kinds 
of currencies should be in circulation. No judicial decision de-
termined the conditions under which the federal government 
could deposit surpluses with state governments or discussed 
whether the federal government could assume state debts. 
Public land policy during the three decades before the Civil 
War was made largely without judicial comment. The Justices 
expressed no opinion on western demands for cheap land, for 
gradation policies that would lower the price of unsold land, for 
preemption policies that would give rights to persons who had 
settled on unsold land, or for homesteading policies that would 
provide incentives for persons to settle the west. Justice McLean 
on circuit rejected claims that territories assumed ownership of 
all public lands within their jurisdiction upon attaining state-
hood.86 That constitutional controversy was never resolved by 
the Supreme Court. No judicial decision discussed whether any 
conditions justified distributing to states the proceeds from the 
sale of public lands. No judicial decision discussed whether the 
federal government could grant states land or other subsidies to 
support higher education. Elected officials debated without judi-
cial assistance the merits of various land grants to railroads, 
various railroad routes to the Pacific Ocean, and Jefferson 
Davis's proposal that camels be used to transport goods west un-
til the railroad was built. The Taney Court in Rice v. Railroad 
Co. 87 did indicate that although Congress had not intended to 
repeal a controversial federal land grant to a railroad, such a re-
peal would be unconstitutional if intended. 
The Taney Court was asked to hand down decisions on fed-
eral power to promote internal improvements, but issued only 
86. See United States v. Gratiot, 26 F. Cas. 12, 13 (C.C.D. Ill., 1839) (No. 15,249). 
87. 66 U.S. (1 Black) 358 (1861) 
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one relatively minor ruling. Counsel in Searight v. Stokes88 de-
clared that the federal government had no power to build post 
roads. 89 The judicial majority refused to discuss this issue, hold-
ing only that the federal government had the constitutional 
power to give states money to repair post roads.90 Justice 
Daniel's dissent in Seari$ht denied any federal power to finance 
internal improvements.9 Dicta in later cases suggest that most 
Taney Court Justices believed that the federal government had 
the power to build lighthouses, but no power to build post 
roads.92 No majority opinion explicitly stated that conclusion. 
With those exceptions, political questions associated with 
the conditions under which the federal government could pay for 
internal improvements were not resolved into judicial questions. 
The Justices were never asked about and never ruled on federal 
power to improve harbors or build canals. No judicial decision 
provided standards for determining when an internal improve-
ment bill satisfied the "national interest" test that Jacksonian 
presidents deemed necessary to approve such projects. Postal 
questions were not resolved into judicial questions. No judicial 
decision discussed the allocation of mail contracts, how to elimi-
nate postal fraud or reduce the postal debt, what were appropri-
ate postal rates, whether the franking privilege was justified, 
whether mail should be delivered on Sunday, and whether the 
Postmaster General should get a bigger office. Federal judges 
did not decide whether the national government should establish 
a national university, adopt a uniform system of weights and 
measures, explore the West, or build an astronomical observa-
tory. 
Tariff policies were made with some, but not extensive, ju-
dicial assistance. Counsel in Aldridge v. Williams93 noted the ar-
gument that protective tariffs were unconstitutional but did not 
ask the Justices to resolve the case on that ground.94 Chief Jus-
tice Taney's majority opinion in that case declared that the Jus-
tices would generally accept government claims that particular 
tariff rates were necessary for revenue.95 Aldridge also ruled as a 
88. 44 U.S. (3 How.) 151 (1845). 
89. See id. at 160 (argument of Mr. Walker). 
90. See id. at 166-67. 
91. See id. at 180-81 (Daniel, J., dissenting). 
92. See Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421, 
442-43 (1856) (McLean, J., dissenting); id. at 449 (Wayne, J., dissenting). 
93. 44 U.S. (3 How.) 9 (1845). 
94. See id. at 12-13 (argument of R. Johnson). 
95. See id. at 26. 
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matter of statutory interpretation that the Tariff Law of 1833 did 
not expire in 1842.96 This resolved a minor controversy within 
the Tyler administration.97 The Justices never discussed the con-
stitutionality of protective tariffs, whether duties should be paid 
in cash, the merits of free trade, the merits of particular tariff 
rates or precise duties on particular goods, the merits of special 
wartime tariffs on tea and coffee, the merits of ad valorem as 
opposed to specific duties, or the precise date new tariff laws 
should take effect. The nullification crisis precipitated by the 
1828 Tariff of Abominations was initiated, fought, and settled in 
nonjudicial forums. No federal judicial decision discussed 
whether South Carolina could nullify a protective tariff. No fed-
eral judicial decision explored whether the Force Bill of 1833 
was an appropriate response to nullification.98 
Bankruptcy was the one political question associated with 
national ecor.omic development almost completely resolved into 
a judicial question, although not a judicial question adjudicated 
by the Supreme Court. The Justices were asked on at least two 
occasions to invalidate aspects of the Bankruptcy Act of 1841. 
The Justices ducked the issue in Nelson v. Carland99 by ruling 
that the Supreme Court had no jurisdiction to hear bankruptcy 
appeals from lower federal courts. 100 The Justices also avoided 
public comment on constitutional issues associated with bank-
ruptcy in Spalding v. New York 101 when affirming a New York 
decision that found the Bankruptcy Act inapplicable on statu-
tory grounds. Chief Justice Taney's one-paragraph opinion 
merely noted that the majority failed to agree on common 
grounds for the decision. 102 This suggests that some Taney Court 
Justices endorsed the claim made by defense counsel that the 
Bankruptcy Act was unconstitutional. 103 Lower federal courts 
handed down numerous decisions on the constitutionality and 
proper interpretation of the Bankruptcy Act during the short pe-
riod of time that statute was on the books.104 Justice Catron on 
96. See id. at 29. 
97. PETERSON, supra note 52, at 160. 
98. Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1858), while discussing nullification, 
cannot be said to have resolved the political questions raised by nullification into judicial 
questwns, given that Ableman was decided thirty years after the nullification crisis was 
settled. 
99. 42 U.S. (1 How.) 265 (1843). 
I 00. See id. at 265-66. 
101. 45 U.S. (4 How.) 21 (1846). 
I 02. See id. at 36. 
I 03. See id. (argument of Mr. Delano). 
104. See, e.g., Ex parte Hull, 12 F. Cas. 853 (D.C.S.D.N.Y. 1842) (No. 6,856); Ex 
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circuit wrote an opinion declaring the law constitutional. 105 At 
least one federal district judge, the judge who first heard Nelson, 
declared the Bankruptcy Act unconstitutional. 106 No federal ju-
dicial decision determined whether persons could be imprisoned 
for debt, or whether laws should be passed guaranteeing that 
employees owed past wages would obtain a fair share of assets 
when their employers declared bankruptcy. 
2a. McCulloch. Several important political and constitu-
tional questions on national economic development not resolved 
into judicial questions during the second party system had been 
resolved into judicial questions during the first party system. 
McCulloch v. Maryland plainly declared that the federal gov-
ernment had the power to incorporate a national bank and exer-
cise any other power not explicitly prohibited by the constitution 
that was reasonably related to a le~itimate constitutional end. 
Five years later, Gibbons v. Odgen °7 advanced a fairly broad 
reading of the commerce power, at least broader than some Jef-
fersonians preferred. Lest their contemporaries harbor any 
doubt about the direction of Marshall Court decisionmaking, 
several Justices on that tribunal wrote President Monroe a letter 
indicating that the principles supporting federal incorporation of 
a national bank committed the court to sustaining the bill au-
thorizing extensive federal internal improvements then awaiting 
executive signature. 108 Given this early judicial commitment to 
national economic development, neither Jacksonian Justices nor 
Jacksonian politicians may have felt the need to have the Su-
preme Court repeat itself. 
McCulloch and Gibbons did not judicially resolve the pre-
cise political questions being debated during the three decades 
before the Civil War. National Republicans/Whigs and Jackson-
ians disputed both the national power to enact and the economic 
advantages of the American System. At most, Marshall Court 
decisions supported claims that the federal government had the 
power to adopt the American System and other proposals for 
national economic development. Nothing in the case law before 
1828 supported claims that the federal government was constitu-
parte Breneman, 4 F. Cas. 54 (D.C.E.D. Penn. 1842) (No. 1,830). 
105. Nelson, 42 U.S. at 277-81 (reprinting Justice Catron's opinion on circuit in In re 
Klein). 
106. See id. at 268-76 (Catron, J., dissenting). 
107. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). 
108. See 1 CHARLES WARREN THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 
596-97 (1947) 1922. 
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tional obligated to incorporate a national bank or fund internal 
improvements, or that these American System proposals were 
desirable public policies. Although Henry Clay and his political 
supporters lost most of their political battles, they refrained from 
asking the Supreme Court to interpret McCulloch as mandating 
the incorporation of a national bank or at least as forbidding the 
president from vetoing laws on either policy grounds or mis-
taken constitutional grounds. 
Whether past judicial precedents sustaining broad federal 
power over national economic development would have been 
reaffirmed in such a lawsuit was doubtful. By the end of Jack-
son's second term, political sentiment in Washington was that 
McCulloch would be overruled whenever the Taney Court was 
presented with a proper case. Thomas Hart Benton on the Sen-
ate floor praised President Jackson for "prepar[ing] the way for 
a reversal of that decision." 109 Daniel Webster in 1841 warned 
Whig associates in Congress that the Supreme Court would al-
most certainly declare unconstitutional any bank bill similar to 
the one sustained by the Marshall Court in McCulloch. 110 Re-
verdy Johnson, a leading Democrat and member of the Supreme 
Court bar, was "convinced that the Court would declare that it 
would be unconstitutional to establish a branch [of the national 
bank] in a state that had specifically refused to sanction it. " 111 
These predictions were quite realistic given the composition 
of the Supreme Court. "The opinions and actions of men are 
known, and the sanctity of the ermine cannot change the charac-
ter of the men," Whigs sadly noted. "Who removed the depos-
its?" Representative Henry A. Wise continued. "Who have since 
been ap~ointed on that supreme bench? How many? By whom? 
Count!" 12 Before joining the court, Roger Taney, Levi Wood-
bury, James Wayne, Philip Pendleton Barbour, John McKinley, 
Nathan Clifford, and John Catron all played prominent roles in 
Jacksonian fights against the national bank and American Sys-
tem. Taney and Woodbury were trusted members of Jackson's 
cabinet (Peter Daniel turned down an invitation to join the cabi-
net)113, Woodbury was in Van Buren's cabinet (Daniel again 
109. CONG. GLOBE, 24th Cong., 2nd Sess. App. 122 (1837). 
110. MERRILL D. PETERSON, THE GREAT TRIUMVIRATE: WEBSTER, CLAY, AND 
CALHOUN 306 (1987). 
Ill. PETERSON, supra note 52, at 70. See Magliocca, supra note 3, at 208, 212, 226, 
248-50, 254-55. 
112. CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 1st Sess. App. 412 (1841). 
113. See SWISHER, supra note 82, at 245. 
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turned down a position) 114, and Clifford was the attorney general 
in the Polk administration. Woodbury had received serious con-
sideration as a Jacksonian presidential candidate; Barbour was 
almost the Jacksonian nominee for the vice presidency in 1832.115 
Woodbury, Wayne, Barbour, McKinley, and Clifford were Jack-
sonian leaders in Congress; Nelson was a Jacksonian candidate 
for the Senate. Baldwin, Taney, Catron, McKinley, and Daniel 
played major roles organizing Jacksonian forces in Pennsylvania, 
Maryland, Tennessee, Alabama, and Virginia respectively. 116 
The majority on the Taney Court was on record either as 
believing McCulloch wrongly decided or as harboring extreme 
anti-bank sentiments. Five Taney Court Justices, Taney, 
Barbour, Daniel, Clifford, and Woodbury had, while in political 
office, declared that the national bank was unconstitutional. 117 
The other orthodox Jacksonian members of the Taney Court 
were either leading opponents of the national back (Wayne, Ca-
tron, McKinley, and possibly Samuel Nelson) 118 or identified 
with political factions or political leaders that regarded the bank 
as unconstitutional (Robert Grier and John Campbell). 119 Only 
five Justices who sat during the Taney era, Joseph Story, Smith 
Thompson, Henry Baldwin, John McLean, and Benjamin Curtis, 
were relatively sure votes for sustaining a national bank bill. 120 
At no time did these five Justices sit together. 
114. See HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES, PRESIDENTS, AND SENATORS, A HISTORY 
OF THE U.S. SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS FROM WASHINGTON TO CLINTON 78, 81 
(rev. ed., 1999). 
115. See SWISHER, supra note 82, at 433, 443. 
116. See ABRAHAM, supra note 114, at 73 ("[l]ong an aggressive and enthusiastic 
supporter. .. , Baldwin had been instrumental in bringing Pennsylvania into the Jackson-
ian fold in the election of 1828"), 74-75 (Taney); 76-77 (Catron), 78 ("McKinley had been 
one of Van Buren's key managers during the presidential campaign of 1836 and was per-
sonally responsible for capturing Alabama's electoral votes"), 78-79 (Daniel); SWISHER, 
supra note 82, at 125-29, 296-98. 
117. For Taney, See SWISHER, supra note 82, at 190-95,345 (1935); for Barbour, see 
Annals of Congress, 16th Cong. 1st Sess. (1218) 1221 (Feb. 10, 1820); for Daniel, see 
JOHN P. FRANK, JUSTICE DANIEL DISSENTING: A BIOGRAPHY OF PETER Y. DANIEL, 
1784-1860113 (1964); for Woodbury, see CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 1st Sess. app. (175) 
180 (1841); for Clifford, see CONG. GLOBE, 26th Cong., 1st Sess. app. (469) 475 (1840). 
118. For Wayne, see ALEXANDER A. LAWRENCE, JAMES MOORE WAYNE: 
SOUTHERN UNIONIST 72 (1943); for Catron, see WALTER CHANDLER, THE CENTENARY 
OF ASSOCIATE JUSTICE JOHN CATRON OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 29 
(1937); for McKinley, see John M. Martin, John McKinley: Jacksonian Phase 28 
ALABAMA HIST. Q. 7, 25-27 (1966); for Nelson, see Edwin Countryman, Samuel Nelson 
19 GREEN BAG 329 (1907). 
119. For Grier, See SWISHER, supra note 82, at 444; for Campbell, see Christine Jor-
dan, Last of the Jacksonians, 1980 SuP. CT. HIST. Y.B. 80. 
120. Story was on the Court when McCulloch was unanimously decided. For Bald-
win, see United States v. Shive, 27 F. Cas. 1065, 1067 (D.C.E.D. Penn. 1832) (No. 16, 
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Taney Court Justices who fought the bank on constitutional 
grounds in the national legislature or national executive might 
nevertheless have thought the Court lacked the power to strike 
down a law authorizing the national bank. Still, the most prob-
able swing votes on that question from 1845 to 1860, Justices 
Wayne and Catron, were militant opponents of the bank whore-
tained strong Jacksonian political connections. Two other swung 
justices, Justices Grier and Nelson, exhibited no such modesty 
after the Civil War when declaring that the government had no 
power to make paper money legal tender for private debts. 121 
Given widespread speculation that McCulloch would be over-
ruled and the numerous attacks on the national bank made by 
Taney Court Justices before being appointed, the reason that po-
litical questions associated with national economic development 
were not resolved into judicial questions from 1828 to 1860 can-
not be a general understanding that those matters had already 
been permanently settled by past judicial decree. 
3. Ethnocultural Issues. The federal judiciary during the 
three decades before the Civil War did not resolve any of the 
major ethnocultural political questions that dominated state po-
litical agendas and occasionally spilled over into the national 
arena. The federal judiciary handed down no decisions on the 
rights of Masons or the wrongs Masons were alleged to have 
committed. No judicial decision explored federal relations with 
the Mormons, such as whether Congress should have permitted 
Mormons in Utah to propose a state constitution, how the fed-
eral government should have responded when a state constitu-
tion was written without congressional permission, whether the 
federal land office was unduly protective of tribal claims only 
when Mormons claimed Native American soil, and whether fed-
eral officials in Utah had been physically prevented from enforc-
ing federal law. Jacksonian federal courts did not rule on 
whether the Mormon legislature could pass a statute that essen-
tially gave Brigham Young the power to determine which fed-
eral laws would be enforced in Utah. Polygamy had to wait for 
judicial resolution until after the Civil War. 122 An entirely Prot-
estant Supreme Court did not respond when Samuel Morse and 
278); for McLean, see Letters of John McLean to John Teesdale, BIBLIOTHECA SACRA, 
Oct. 1899, at 720; for Curtis, see 1 GEORGE TICKNOR CURTIS, MEMOIR OF BENJAMIN 
ROBBINS CURTIS, LL.D. 115 (Benjamin R. Curtis, ed., 1879) for Thompson, see DONALD 
MALCOLM ROPER, MR. JUSTICE THOMPSON AND THE CONSTITUTION 296 (1987). 
121. See Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603 (1869). 
122. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). 
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others called for a united front "against Catholic schools, Catho-
lic officeholders, and especially against lenient immigrant 
laws. "123 The justices neither issued official condemnations of 
Catholic institutions or Catholic participation in politics nor 
spoke out for religious freedom and tolerance. The political 
questions raised by Know-Nothings and other nativist groups 
were not resolved into judicial questions. No federal judicial de-
cision sought to settle any significant controversy over the immi-
gration or naturalization of white persons, although the Supreme 
Court in the Passenger Cases124 did rule that states could not tax 
ships bringing new immigrants. Neither the nascent women's 
movement nor movements to reform schools, asylums, and pris-
ons attracted federal judicial attention. That the American Tem-
perance Society had more members than the American Anti-
Slavery Society125 did not inspire any judicial decision on 
whether governing officials could ban alcohol. The Justices 
failed to intervene in a Senate debate over whether to invite an 
Irish priest opposed to both slavery and drinking. 
4. National Expansion. The Supreme Court from 1828 until 
1860 was not asked to resolve any major political question on the 
subject of national expansion. No judicial decision discussed the 
general merits of Manifest Destiny as public policy. No judicial 
decision sought to resolve controversies over the appropriate 
border between Maine and Canada, between Oregon and Can-
ada, between Texas and New Mexico, or, though not an issue of 
national expansion, between New York and New Jersey. No ju-
dicial decision discussed the merits of purchasing Alaska, Ha-
waii, Cuba, or any part of Mexico. Federal justices were not 
asked to resolve and did not resolve debates over the Ostend 
Manifesto and other suggestions that Cuba be acquired by force. 
No judicial decision determined how much if any of Mexico to 
obtain and at what price as a result of the Mexican War. No judi-
cial decision determined whether the United States should annex 
Canada. President Buchanan's more general effort "to annex 
everything from the Rio Grande to Columbia at the risk of war" 
attracted no official federal judicial notice. 126 
123. PETERSON, supra note 52, at 2-3. 
124. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849). 
125. BERGERON, supra note 53, at 7; GARA, supra note 55, at 96; Robert V. 
Remini, Election of 1828, in 1 HISTORY OF AMERICAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 1789-
1968, at 431 (Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., & Fred Israel eds., 1971). 
126. SMITH, supra note 56, at 78. 
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Political questions that arose when expansion efforts were 
successful similarly escaped judicial notice. No judicial opinion 
considered any issue raised by the annexation of Texas, the as-
sumption of past Texas debts or whether to divide Texas into as 
many as five states. The Supreme Court did not resolve whether 
the United States could annex a foreign country or the condi-
tions under which territory could be added to the United States. 
With the exception of slavery, major political questions over the 
organization of territories were not resolved into judicial ques-
tions. Debates over California and New Mexico statehood were 
resolved without judicial assistance. 
5. Foreign Policy. The Supreme Court did not resolve any 
major foreign policy question that arose during the three dec-
ades before the Civil War. No judicial decision considered the 
merits of American policy toward Mexico before the Mexican 
War, after the Mexican war, the justice of the Mexican War, the 
appropriate strategies for fighting the Mexican war, whether 
anyone, most notably Senator Thomas Hart Benton, should have 
been made a lieutenant general during the Mexican War, or 
whether the United States should have invaded Mexico at the 
end of the Buchanan administration. The Supreme Court did 
rule that the President had the power to apply revenue laws to 
California while California was occupied territory, 127 but had no 
power to establish prize courts. 128 Federal courts did not become 
involved in the Carolene incident, a dispute over whether New 
Y ark state courts could try a British national who had destroyed 
an American ship that was supplying Canadian rebels, the de-
bate over whether to help the British find Sir John Franklin, or 
in any other matter concerning Anglo-American relationships. 
No judicial decision discussed the merits of the Clayton-Bulver 
treaty, the Gadsden Purchase treaty, the Webster-Ashburton 
treaty, the Zollverein treaty, the Dallas-Clarendon agreement, 
the Guadalupe-Hidalgo treaty, proposed agreements with Mex-
ico to allow American companies to build roads, the proposed 
McLane-Ocampo treaty or any other controversial agreement 
with a foreign nation. Political questions on how to interpret or 
whether to abrogate those treaties were similarly not resolved 
into judicial questions. 
No judicial decision helped resolve controversies over 
American relationships with China, Canada, Russia, Hawaii, Ja-
127. See Cross v. Harrison, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 164 (1853). 
128. See Jecker v. Montgomery, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 498 (1851). 
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pan, Holland, China, Germany, Central America or South 
America. Americans in 1835 debated without judicial assistance 
whether to go to war with France, and in the 1850s Americans 
debated without judicial assistance whether to compensate vic-
tims of earlier French shipping policies. No judicial decision dis-
cussed the extent to which the United States should have sup-
ported democratic revolutions in Europe or intervened in the 
Crimean War. No judicial decision discussed such questions of 
international trade as the Peruvian monopoly in guano or how to 
encourage European countries to buy more southern rice. Fed-
eral courts played no role in legislative efforts to regulate pass-
ports and reform the diplomatic service. Federal courts stayed 
out of the political debate over whether to pay Nicholas Trist for 
his efforts when he continued to negotiate for Mexican land con-
cessions after being recalled as the envoy to that nation. 
6. Native Americans. Political questions associated with na-
tive Americans were resolved into judicial questions only at the 
very beginning of the Jacksonian era. The late Marshall Court 
after some hesitation129 attempted to play a significant role in 
conflicts between southern states and the Cherokees over tribal 
lands. 130 Major resettlement issues arose after 1832, but the 
Taney Court played no role in their resolution. No judicial deci-
sion discussed any aspect of federal relationships with the Semi-
noles, including the controversial practice of using bloodhounds 
to help remove members of that tribe from Florida. Political 
questions over federal supervision of settled tribes and trading 
policy were similarly not resolved into judicial questions. 
7. Military Policy. Supreme Court justices rarely partici-
pated in the domestic military controversies that excited Jack-
sonian America. Two political questions were resolved into judi-
cial questions: whether Admiral Stephen Decatur's spouse was 
entitled to a special pension and the possibly corrupt procure-
ment practices of President Buchanan's Secretary of War. 131 The 
Justices stayed out of political debates over who should com-
mand American military forces, what was the best command 
structure, and whether commanders should answer to the secre-
tary of war. No federal judicial decision discussed how military 
forces should be organized, trained, disciplined, paid, and 
equipped, how those forces should be employed in peacetime, or 
129. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831). 
130. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). 
131. See Decatur v. Paulding, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 497 (1840); See The Floyd Accep-
tances, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 666 (1868). 
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whether ten new regiments were needed in the wake of the 
Mexican War. No judicial decision resolved the controversy over 
whether cannons should be transported to Texas during the se-
cession controversy. Federal courts did not determine whether 
the United States should establish a naval academy or rely more 
on steam than sail ships. Supreme Court Justices did not resolve 
political questions associated with military discipline. President 
Tyler's cabinet, not the Taney Court, determined whether to try 
in a federal court a captain who executed the son of a prominent 
government official for mutiny. 
8. The Staffing and Structure of National Institutions. The 
Supreme Court did not resolve any major political question that 
arose during the second party system over the staffing of the na-
tional government. Judicial decisions neither endorsed candi-
dates for any national office nor ruled that the candidates of one 
coalition were superior to the candidates of other coalitions. The 
federal judiciary never resolved any political question concern-
ing whom a party should nominate for the presidency and vice-
presidency, or the rules governing those nominations. No judicial 
decision discussed the character or qualifications of persons run-
ning for national office. Federal courts did not become involved 
in bitter debates during the 1828 presidential campaign over 
whether John Quincy Adams made a "corrupt bargain" to ob-
tain office or over whether Andrew Jackson improperly married 
his wife. The soaring costs of presidential elections did not at-
tract official judicial notice. No judicial decision resolved debates 
over whether the Vice-President became president or merely as-
sumed presidential powers when the President died in office. 
Without judicial assistance, Americans debated what would 
happen if both the presidency and vice-presidency became va-
cant. The Justices were not asked to resolve and did not resolve 
the bitter legislative debates that frequently occurred when the 
House of Representatives elected its speaker and both Houses 
of Congress elected their official printer. The Justices did not ad-
judicate debates over the appointment of federal judges, ambas-
sadors to foreign countries, cabinet members, and other mem-
bers of the executive branch. John C. Calhoun killed Martin Van 
Buren's appointment to be minister to Great Britain without ju-
dicial support or resistance. The Justices did not participate in 
the debate over whether Tyler should have kept Harrison's 
cabinet, or the debate over whether Jackson demonstrated "vin-
dictive party spirit" when he dissolved his first cabinet. No judi-
cial decision explored controversial decisions by Jacksonian ex-
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ecutives to appoint members of Congress and ~ress editors to 
executive positions. The Justices in In re Hennen 32 did rule that, 
absent a federal statute to the contrary, federal judges could 
cashier their clerks at will. With that exception, the Justices did 
not become involved in any debate over the proper procedures 
for appointing or removing federal officials. No decision dis-
cussed the conditions under which executive officials could be 
removed, whether Congress had to approve removals, or 
whether the president had to give reasons for a removal. No de-
cision handed down before the Civil War discussed the merits of 
the congressional decision in 1842 that required states to elect 
national representatives in single-member districts. No federal 
judicial decision discussed other controversies over federal inter-
ference in local elections, the merits of requiring a plurality 
rather than a majority vote in an election for Speaker of the 
House, the merits of supermajoritarian rules for nominating 
candidates for the presidency, the merits of a one-term presi-
dency, or the appropriations necessary to pay federal salaries. 
The Justices did not even issue official opinions on the merits of 
various proposals to reorganize the federal judiciary. 
The Supreme Court did not resolve any major political 
question raised by the new forms and styles of governance asso-
ciated with the rise of mass political parties before the Civil War. 
Judicial decisions did not rule on the legitimacy of permanent 
political parties, the merits of a two-party system, or the vices 
and virtues of mass political parties as compared to the more 
deferential form of earlier American politics. The merits of uni-
versal male suffrage, the congressional caucus, or national con-
ventions were not placed on the agenda of the late Marshall or 
Taney Courts. Federal judges did not participate in the 1844 de-
bate over whether the Democratic Party should require a presi-
dential nominee to obtain a supermajority vote in the national 
convention. The Justices were asked to determine the conditions 
under which the citizens of Rhode Island could adopt a new 
state constitution and to adjudicate other issues arising out of the 
Dorr Rebellion. The Taney Court declined on the ground that 
national elected officials were constitutionally authorized to de-
termine both whether a state had a republican government and 
which officials legitimately held office in that state. 133 No judicial 
decision discussed the merits of the spoils system, the increasing 
132. 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 230 (1839). 
\33. See Luther v. Boren, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849). 
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influence of patronage in American politics, the power of state 
legislatures to instruct Senators, or the extent to which federal 
officeholders could participate in political campaigns. Federal 
courts did not resolve the allegations of corruption against ex-
ecutive officials during the Galphin Affair, when one cabinet 
member awarded a large sum of money to another cabinet 
member. Alleged corruption in the Van Buren and other ad-
ministrations similarly attracted no official federal judicial no-
tice. Political questions associated with the partisan presses of 
the Jacksonian era were not resolved into federal judicial ques-
tions. No judicial decision resolved debates over who would edit 
the administration newspaper, a position equivalent to the con-
temporary presidential press secretary, whether Congress could 
expel reporters from legislative chambers, or who was leaking 
confidential administration information to the press. 
The Supreme Court generally refrained from participating 
in the national debates over the presidential role pioneered by 
Jackson and practiced, with less success, by his successors in of-
fice. No judicial decision discussed the appropriate use of the 
veto power, whether the President could deliver the Annual 
Message before Congress organized, the appropriate division of 
power between cabinet officials and the President, the power of 
the President to make recess appointments, whether Congress 
could appoint the Secretary of the Treasury or define the tenure 
of executive offices, the power of Congress to censure the presi-
dent, or the power of Congress to expunge the record of that 
censure. No judicial ruling decided whether Congress or the 
president best represented the people. The Justices on narrow 
grounds held that presidents could impose a war tariff, 134 but not 
create prize courts in the absence of congressional legislation. 135 
The Justices also ruled in Kendall v. Stokes 136 that federal courts 
could issue a writ of mandamus to executive officials. 137 No judi-
cial decision was forthcoming on more controversial exercises of 
executive power before the Civil War. The Supreme Court was 
not asked to rule and did not rule on whether President Jackson 
was authorized to remove federal deposits from the national 
bank or to require that persons buying federal land pay in specie. 
134. See Jecker v. Montgomery, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 498 (1852). 
135. See Cross v. Harrison, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 164 (1854). 
136. 44 U.S. (3 How.) 87 (1845). 
137. See also United States ex rei. Stokes v. Kendall, 26 F. Cas. 702 (C.C.D.C. 1837) 
(no. 15, 517). For the political salience of that debate, see WILSON, supra note 51, at 174-
75. 
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The Justices did not determine whether President Tyler's deci-
sion to follow Jackson's precedents on appointments and vetoes 
was an executive usurpation that warranted impeachment. Nor 
did the Justices intervene in debates over whether cabinet mem-
bers should always publicly support the president or the precise 
degree of presidential influence over the Treasury Department. 
9. Other Political Questions. The Supreme Court before the 
Civil War did not resolve into judicial questions various ques-
tions of political morality, responsibility, or sociology. Republi-
cans and southern Democrats debated the morality of slavery 
without judicial assistance. Daniel Webster and William Seward 
debated the morality of compromising with slavery without judi-
cial assistance. No judicial decision resolved the debates between 
J acksonians and their political opponents over whether the fed-
eral government ought to promote national economic and moral 
improvement. Informal understandings that northerners would 
support that gag rule in return for southerners refraining from 
pressing Texas annexation were not judicially supported or judi-
cially challenged. No federal judicial decision determined who 
was responsible for the Panic of 1837 or corruption in the Van 
Buren administration. No federal judicial decision determined 
what caused increases in strikes and mob violence during the 
Jacksonian era, whether slavery would thrive in various Western 
territories, or whether slavery must expand or die. The Senate 
debated who wrote an anonymous letter to the Washington Un-
ion condemning the initial rejection of the ten regiment bill 
without judicial assistance. 
Political questions associated with whether to amend the 
Constitution were not resolved into judicial questions. Federal 
courts did not rule on the merits of proposals to alter the presi-
dential veto, have co-presidents from North and South, ban 
small bank notes, or any other constitutional amendment cham-
pioned from 1828 to 1860. Previous judicial decisions had made 
clear that the Constitution as interpreted by the Taney Court 
supported many southern demands during the secession crisis. 
Dred Scott supported the right to bring slaves into all territories. 
Prigg sustained the Fugitive Act and clearly indicated that al-
leged fugitive slaves had no rights to jury trials in the state where 
they were found. No judicial decision discussed whether Ameri-
cans should have ratified constitutional amendments that pro-
vided more explicit textual protection for slavery in order to 
prevent legislative, executive, or judicial backsliding. 
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Jacksonians did not resolve into judicial questions the po-
litical questions associated with the best strategies for securing 
certain political goals. The Justices did not become involved in 
debates over the best means for obtaining office or the best 
means for obtaining favorable legislation. Congress debated 
without judicial assistance whether Daniel Webster should have 
used bribery to help settle the Maine border, and whether com-
promise with Britain was appropriate to settle the Oregon 
boundary. Federal courts were not asked to resolve and did not 
resolve whether all the measures that eventually became the 
compromise of 1850 should have been voted on together or 
separately. No judicial decision determined the relationship be-
tween distribution and the tariff that vexed policymakers during 
the Tyler years, helped Tyler decide whether to call a special ses-
sion on Texas annexation, or resolved debates over whether the 
bill annexing Texas was best left to the incoming Polk admini-
stration. The Justices did not rule on whether Henry Clay should 
have avoided talking about Texas during the 1844 campaign or 
been more willing to compromise with President Tyler on bank 
legislation three years previously. The Justices did not officially 
advise President Van Buren on how to respond to initial defeats 
of the Independent Treasury bill, Daniel Webster on whether to 
remain in Tyler's cabinet, or James Buchanan on whether to 
take a Supreme Court seat. Nor did federal judges officially help 
mediate President Tyler's relationships with Democrats and 
Whigs, or whether President Jackson and Daniel Webster should 
have formed a political alliance in the wake of the nullification 
crisis. The Justices did not rule on how many presidential candi-
dates the Whigs should have run in 1836, or on whether the 
Whigs should have drafted a platform in 1840. The Justices did 
not decide questions central to the destruction of the second 
party system, such as whether the vote on the 1860 Democratic 
platform should have been delayed until after the candidate was 
chosen, whether President Buchanan should have supported 
Stephen Douglas, whether southern delegates should have 
bolted the convention, how the convention should have re-
sponded to that bolt, and whether all opponents of Abraham 
Lincoln should have joined forces. 
The Supreme Court did not resolve any political questions 
raised by social life in Washington during the Jacksonian era. 
The Justices did not resolve any issue arising out of the Eaton 
Affair. The Justices did not participate as Justices in the social 
rivalry between Harriet Lane and Adele Douglas that signifi-
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cantly influenced the politics of the late 1850s, as "the leaders of 
each Democratic faction scrupulously avoid[ ed] the parties of 
the other." 138 Judicial decisions did not discuss whether the 
polka was too risque a dance to be performed in the White 
House, comment on President Buchanan's decision to ban danc-
ing and card playing in the executive mansion, rule on whether 
President Adams's decision to install a billiard table was a le-
gitimate campaign issue in 1828, or resolve debates over how 
much money was needed to refurnish the White House. The ju-
diciary did not participate in the controversy over the "dress cir-
cular," a Pierce administration edict ordering persons in the dip-
lomatic service to wear more formal attire. 
B. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SUPREME COURT AND 
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS IN JACKSONIAN AMERICA 
The rarity with which party platforms and supplementary 
sources on Jacksonian politics discuss federal judicial decisions 
further highlights the remarkably low salience of the Supreme 
Court and federal judiciary before the Civil War whenever slav-
ery was not on the table. Party platforms mention the Supreme 
Court once, when Douglas Democrats in 1860 sought judicial 
rulings on the claimed federal obligation to protect slavery in the 
territories. 139 United States ex rel. Stokes v. Kendall, which held 
that federal judges could order the Secretary of the Treasury to 
pay a specific government debt, was the only federal court deci-
sion not involving slavery mentioned in a presidential address. 
President Martin Van Buren publicly attacked that decision in 
1838,140 but a Jacksonian Congress showed no interest in pursu-
ing the matter. 141 Political histories of presidential campaigns 
and administrations pay almost no attention to the federal judi-
ciary. Judging only from political histories of presidential ad-
ministrations, Americans during the 1840s and 1850s were more 
concerning with importing bird droppings than with any Su-
preme Court case not directly related to slavery. No Supreme 
Court decision or doctrine not concerned with slavery is men-
tioned as frequently as issues associated with the Pervusian mo-
138. SMITH, supra note 56, at 87-88. 
139. See Democratic Platform, in 1 NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS, supra note 47, at 
30-31; SMITH, supra note 56, at 112. 
140. Martin Van Buren, Second Annual Message, in MESSAGES AND PAPERS, 
supra note 48, at 503-05. 
141. See HAROLD M. HYMAN & WILLIAM M. WIECEK, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER 
LAW: CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT, 1835-1875 48-49 (1982). 
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nopoly on guano. 142 When on matters not related to slavery, the 
federal judiciary is mentioned in either the primary or secondary 
sources, the reference is most often to proposed expansions and 
reforms of the federal circuit courts, 14 a political question not 
resolved into a judicial question. Readers of Michael Holt's one-
thousand page tome, The Rise and Fall of the American Whig 
Party: Jacksonian Politics and the Onset of the Civil War, 144 will 
not find one Supreme Court decision worthy of mention. They 
would have to read that volume and other detailed political his-
tories fairly closely even to learn that a federal judiciary existed 
during the years immediately after Tocqueville declared that 
"[ s ]carcely any political question arises in the United States that 
is not resolved, sooner or later, into a judicial question." 
The contract and dormant commerce clause cases that 
dominated the constitutional part of the Supreme Court's 
agenda during the Jacksonian era were not associated with the 
most riveting national political strugp,les of that time period. 
Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge 45 and Cooley v. Board of 
Wardens 146 are today described as landmark judicial decisions, 
excerpted in virtually all constitutional law casebooks, and dis-
cussed at length in historical commentaries on the Supreme 
Court. Neither those cases nor their underlying controversies are 
mentioned in party platforms or the supplemental sources sur-
veyed on Jacksonian politics. Barron v. Baltimore,147 Swift v. Ty-
son, 
148 and Foster v. Neilson 149 are other rulings some contempo-
rary scholars described as landmark cases that are not 
mentioned by the primary and secondary sources. 15° Contempo-
rary scholars refer to New York v. Miln, 151 Briscoe v. Bank of 
Kentucky, 152 and Charles River Bridge as "The Three Bomb-
shells of 1837. "153 The evidence for this claim consists largely of 
142. See GARA, supra note 55 at 6; SMITH, supra note 54, at 226-27. 
143. See GARA, supra note 55 at 69-70; COLE, supra note 50, at 242. 
144. See HOLT, supra note 57. 
145. 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837). 
146. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851). 
147. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833). 
148. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). 
149. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829). 
150. For one conventional list of landmark Supreme Court decisions, see LEE 
EPSTEIN, ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM: DATA, DECISIONS AND 
DEVELOPMENTS 81-94 (1994). 
151. 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102 (1837) (holding that states may regulate the passengers 
whom ships bring into the states). 
152. 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 257 (1837) (holding that state banks may issue negotiable in-
struments). 
153. DAVID CURRIE. THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST 
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assertions by Joseph Story,154 a Supreme Court Justice; Daniel 
Webster, the losing attorney in Charles River Bridge;155 and 
James Kent, the leading constitutional commentator of the 
era.
156 Jacksonian politicians with less intimate relationships with 
the Supreme Court were not very concerned with these cases, 
certainly not as concerned as they were with the issues associ-
ated with the American System. None of these "bombshell" de-
cisions were mentioned in a party platform, presidential mes-
sage, or any other source surveyed on Jacksonian politics. John 
Quincy Adams did not mention any case associated with "The 
'Revolution' of 1837"157 in the 120 diary pages he devoted to that 
year. 158 Stanley Kutler's book on the Charles River Bridge ruling 
acknowledges that the judicial "decision did not arouse much 
comment outside of Massachusetts."159 
The different weight legal and other elites place on contract 
clause and dormant contract clause issues casts doubt on recent 
assertions that "salience means roughly the same thing to news-
paper editors as it does to the justices ... since both justices and 
editors make this calculation about the same time, within the same 
political context." 160 Joseph Story, Daniel Webster, and John 
Quincy Adams, three Whigs from Massachusetts, had different 
issue priorities that appear related to their different relationships 
to the federal judiciary. The question needs more investigation, 
but given evidence that legal elites have different opinions on le-
gal matters than other citizens, some reason exists for thinking 
that the priorities of legal and journalistic elites might also be 
different. 
Most Americans did not notice Taney Court rulings on state 
regulatory power because federal judicial decisions before the 
Civil War discussing state economic regulations were typically of 
interest only to the parties before the court and the state whose 
measures were under constitutional attack. "[I]t was (and is) a 
HUNDRED YEARS 1789-1888 204 (1985). 
154. See STANLEY l. KUTLER, PRIVILEGE AND CREATIVE DESTRUCTION: THE 
CHARLES RIVER BRIDGE CASE 120-21 (1971). 
155. See MAURICE G. BAXTER, ONE AND INSEPARABLE: DANIEL WEBSTER AND 
THE UNION 444 (1984). 
156. See KUTLER, supra note 154, at 117-18, 120. 
157. KUTLER, supra note 154, at 117. 
158. See 9 JOHN QUINCY ADAMS, MEMOIRS OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS, 
COMPRISING PORTIONS OF HIS DIARY FROM 1795 TO 1848 340-461 (Charles Francis 
Adams ed., 1969). 
159. KUTLER, supra note 154, at 183. 
160. Lee Epstein and Jeffrey A. Segal, Measuring Issue Salience, 44 AM. 1. POL. SCI. 
66,73 (2000) (emphasis in original). 
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peculiarity of the states' rights doctrine," Robert McCloskey 
points out, "that its partisans were devoted to it only when their 
own oxen were being gored, when nationalism presented a spe-
cific threat to a concrete interest." 161 His study, The American 
Supreme Court, observes, "if Virginia had a problem today that 
Maryland did not share, Virginia's outraged protest in the name 
of states' rights would attract little support from Maryland any 
more than Maryland's similar protest tomorrow would bring 
Virginia rushing to her standard." 162 Contract and dormant 
commerce clause issues mattered locally, and local politics typi-
cally mattered more than national politics during the three dec-
ades before the Civil War. Still, Supreme Court decisions on 
state regulatory powers do not appear to have any significant 
impact on the structure of Jacksonian national politics. 
The 1832 "Address of the National Republican Conven-
tion" did make an oblique reference to the contract and dormant 
commerce clause issues when condemnin~ Jacksonians for seek-
ing to end judicial review of state laws. 63 Prominent National 
Republicans no doubt had contract clause and possibly dormant 
commerce clause concerns in mind when attacking proposed re-
peals of section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789. Still, that cam-
paign document did not give any example of an offending state 
law or vital judicial decision that justified maintaining the judi-
cial power to void state laws. Moreover, Democrats by Jackson's 
second term were increasingly sympathetic to judicial review. 
The political controversy over section 25 was largely settled in 
favor of judicial power by 1832. The House of Representatives in 
1831 voted by an almost three-to-one margin to maintain judicial 
review of state laws and the next year voted by a six-to-one mar-
gin against limiting judicial tenure. 164 Thus, even on the most op-
timistic reading of the evidence, the Supreme Court's contract 
clause and dormant commerce clause jurisprudence may have 
provoked important national controversies only during the earli-
est years of the Jacksonian era. 
161. ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 38 (Sanford Lev-
inson 2000). 
162. ld.; see Leslie Friedman Goldstein, State Resistance to Authority in Federal Un-
ions: The Early United States (1790-1860) and the European Community (1958-94), 11 
STUD. AM. POL. DEY. 149, 155-56, 166, 185 (1997). 
163. See Address of the National Republican Convention, in 1 HISTORY OF 
AMERICAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, supra note 125, at 564. 
164 .. See Charles Warren, Legislative and Judicial Attacks on the Supreme Court of 
the Umted States: A Htstory of the Twenty-Fifth Section of the Judiciary Act, 47 AM. L. 
REV. 161, 164-65 (1913). 
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Relatively low salience is not no salience. Charles River 
Bridge and related judicial decisions did attract some national 
attention and stir some partisan debate. The Washington Na-
tional Intellifencer in 1831 declared that case was of "much im-
portance."16 The merits of the eventual decision were debated 
in the leading journals of the period.166 Later Taney Court deci-
sions on the regulatory powers of state governments inspired 
similar commentary in the press and in the national legislature. 
Charles Warren notes that Pennsylvania v. Wheeling and Bel-
mont Bridge Co. 167 "caused much excitement"168 when decided, 
and that Justice McKinlets unreported decision on circuit in 
Bank of Augusta v. Earle16 "was hailed with enthusiasm by large 
sections of the Democratic, or Locofoco, Party."170 
Still, innumerable national political questions no doubt re-
ceived an occasional comment in leading presses and journals. 
The level of attention paid to contract and dormant commerce 
clause issues, while not negligible, was substantially less than the 
attention national Jacksonian actors gave to such issues as the 
tariff, national bank, internal improvements, the Mexican War, 
reform of the military, and relationships between the elected 
branches of government. The "Revolution of 1837," while not 
insignificant, would not be considered by any Jacksonian politi-
cian or contemporary historian of Jacksonian America as involv-
ing one of the ten most important national political questions of 
that period. By almost any criteria, the presidential veto and 
Eaton Affair were far more important and had far more lasting 
impacts on American political and constitutional developments. 
Justice Catron was not exaggerating when in 1845 he de-
clared that Pollard v. Hagan 171 is "deemed the most important 
controversy ever brought before this court, either as it respects 
the amount of property involved, or the principles in which the 
present judgment proceeds." 172 That dispute over ownership of 
riverbeds when a territory became a state was far more politi-
cally interesting than the debates underlying the vast majority of 
165. KUTLER, supra note 154, at 57. 
166. See id. at 117-21,127-29. 
167. 54 U.S. (13 How.) 518 (1852) 
168. 2 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 235-
36 (1947). 
169. That decision was modified by the Supreme Court in Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 
38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519 (1839). 
170. 2 WARREN, supra note 168, at 51. 
171. 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845). 
172. /d. at 235 (Catron, J., dissenting). 
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antebellum federal cases. The modal Supreme Court case in this 
time period involved factual disputes over individual land titles. 
Numerous land titles were at stake in Pollard, 173 and the issue 
received some congressional attention. 174 Still, proponents of 
Tocqueville's thesis might consider that the issue Jacksonian Jus-
tices considered "the most important" political question adjudi-
cated by the Supreme Court received scant attention by Jackson-
ian political elites and receives no attention in general political 
histories of the Jacksonian era. Pollard v. Hagan and Charles 
River Bridge were considered important questions by Supreme 
Court Justices and Supreme Court watchers only because the 
really important political questions of the Jacksonian era were 
not being resolved into judicial questions. 
IV. EXPLANATIONS: THEN AND NOW 
Political questions were not automatically resolved into ju-
dicial questions in Jacksonian America. Two distinct processes 
had to occur for judges to have the opportunity to hand down 
decisions on a public controversy. First, the political question 
had to be resolved into a legal question or a question of constitu-
tional law. Second, the legal or constitutional question had to be 
resolved into a judicial question. Hardly any national political 
question arose in Jacksonian America that was resolved into a 
question about the meaning of a federal statute. The national 
government during the three decades before the Civil War 
passed very few major statutes and, slavery aside, those statutes 
embodied clear choices among policy alternatives. Many politi-
cal questions arose in the antebellum United States that were 
not resolved into questions about the meaning of the federal 
constitution. In numerous policy areas, Jacksonian and Whigs 
generally agreed that government officials or other decision-
makers had the constitutional power to choose among various 
proposed alternatives. Debate was entirely over which alterna-
tive policy or decision was best. Remarkably, hardly any consti-
tutional question arose in the antebellum United States that was 
resolved into a judicial question. The vast majority of political 
questions that spawned constitutional debate failed to appear on 
the judicial agenda because elected officials rejected the consti-
tutionally controversial policy, no external support system ex-
173. See Hallett v. Beebe, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 25 (1851); Goodtitle ex dem. Pollard v. 
Kibbe, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 471 (1850). 
174. See ERNEST R. BARTLEY, THE TIDELANDS OIL CONTROVERSY 63 (1979). 
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isted to litigate the constitutional issue, or political actors de-
cided self-consciously to resolve the constitutional issue outside 
of courts. 
The processes that determined in 1835 whether political 
questions were resolved into judicial questions continue structur-
ing the judicial agenda at the turn of the twenty-first century. 
Many national political questions are now resolved into ques-
tions about the meaning of federal statutes. Congress passes nu-
merous laws, many of which contain language that foists crucial 
policy choices off on the federal judiciary or on administrative 
agencies subject to judicial oversight. Most political questions 
that arise in contemporary American politics, however, are not 
resolved into questions about the meaning of constitutional pro-
visions. Republicans and Democrats on matters as diverse as tax, 
health, and foreign policy generally agree that the national gov-
ernment has the power to choose among proposed alternatives. 
As did Whigs and Jacksonians, they dispute only the merits of 
various policies. The main difference between now and then is 
that the vast majority of constitutional questions that have arisen 
during the past half-century are resolved into judicial questions. 
Government consistently makes constitutionally controversial 
policies, substantial support for constitutional litigation exists, 
and elected officials for the past one-hundred and fifty years 
have sought to foster judicial power to adjudicate constitutional 
questions. 
A. POLITICAL QUESTIONS INTO CONSTITUTIONAL 
(LEGAL) QUESTIONS 
Political questions are resolved into constitutional questions 
only when a distinctive controversy exists over whether the Con-
stitution permits, forbids, or requires a decisionmaker to select a 
particular policy or make some other political choice. Political 
controversies over the quality of President Tyler's judicial nomi-
nees were not resolved into constitutional controversies because 
Tyler's Whig opponents agreed that Tyler was constitutionally 
permitted to make judicial nominations and Tyler agreed that 
Whigs in the Senate were constitutionally permitted to reject 
those nominees. Disagreement was entirely over whether Tyler 
had nominated wisely. For the same reason, political controver-
sies over other presidential appointments, appropriate political 
strategies, and social life in Washington were not resolved into 
legal or constitutional controversies. An ambitious politician 
who showed up at the wrong party might have made a serious 
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political mistake, but the decision whether to be a Whig or 
whether to respond to an invitation from Peggy Eaton, all 
agreed, was one that an individual politician was constitutionally 
permitted to make. Anticipating Felix Frankfurter, Whigs and 
Jacksonians agreed that in many instances "constitutionality" is 
not "synonymous with wisdom." 175 
This distinction between legality and wisdom, regarded by 
some contemporary social scientists as illusory, had substantial 
bite in 1835. The set of political questions that no one thought 
could be resolved into legal questions was far larger than Toc-
queville's thesis suggests. Americans debated matters as diverse 
as the best way to staff an army, what trade agreements to reach 
with foreign countries, and whether various government officials 
ought to be sanctioned for various "corrupt bargains" without 
resolving those political questions about the merits of various al-
ternatives into constitutional questions about whether power ex-
isted to make particular decisions. Participants in the 1835 de-
bate over whether to go to war with France agreed that Congress 
had the constitutional power to declare war. The dispute was 
over whether to exercise that power. John Quincy Adams re-
garded the rule counting every slave as three-fifths of a person as 
pernicious, but constitutional. 
Jacksonians rarely resolved political questions into legal 
questions, questions involving the interpretation of federal law. 
With the usual exception of slavery, federal statutes passed dur-
ing the three decades before the civil war clearly embodied a 
particular policy choice. Neither Whigs nor Democrats believed 
in delegating such matters as national economic development or 
national expansion to the courts or to an administrative agency 
subject to judicial supervision. Tariff laws, for example, declared 
specific duties on various goods. Political actors vigorously dis-
puted the proper degree of protection, but those disputes were 
over the best tariff policy, not the best interpretation of existing 
tariff laws. 
Contemporary Americans are far more inclined than Jack-
sonians to resolve political questions about desirable public poli-
cies into legal questions about the meaning of federal law. Nu-
merous provisions in federal statutes do not establish clear rules, 
but rather articulate guidelines to be administered directly by 
courts or by administrative agencies subject to judicial supervi-
175. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,670 (1943) (Frank-
furter, J., dissenting). 
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sion. The Sherman Anti-Trust Act's ban on "contracts in re-
straint of trade," 176 for example, was designed to foster judicial 
policymaking in the guise of statutory interpretation. The legisla-
tive sponsors of that measure publicly admitted that they did not 
know what that phrase meant, that its meaning could be clarified 
only by adjudication. 177 Congress resolved a political question 
into a legal question because persons who disputed the best anti-
trust policy after passage of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act had a 
nearly identical dispute over proper interpretation of federal an-
titrust law. 
Contemporary Americans do not, however, resolve most 
political questions into constitutional questions. A cursory sur-
vey of contemporary party platforms reveals numerous policy 
differences that are not presently disputes about the best inter-
pretation of the constitution. Both the Republican and Democ-
ratic Party platforms adopted for the 2000 national election em-
phasized tax policy. 178 Republicans favored giving affluent 
Americans a large tax cut. Democrats favored more targeted tax 
cuts. Neither party declared the other's preferred policy uncon-
stitutional. Democrats and Republicans dispute how tax burdens 
should be allocated, but both coalitions agree that elected offi-
cials are constitutionally authorized to determine the precise 
levels at which Americans should be taxed. War power issues 
aside, the substantial disputes between the two parties over for-
eign policy have not been resolved into constitutional disputes. 
Under the heading "Principled American Leadership" the 2000 
Republican Platform listed thirteen failings of the Clinton ad-
ministration, ranging from "the administration has run American 
defenses down" to "a misguided policy toward China." No claim 
is made that these mistaken policies are also unconstitutional. 
The 2000 Democratic Platform called for "Accessible, Afford-
able, Quality Health Care," charged Republicans with "re-
fus[ing] to use one penny of the surplus to secure the solvency of 
Medicare" and "leav[ing] to drug companies the decisions about 
whether and where a drug benefit might be offered." Again, no 
suggestion is made that these policy differences are constitu-
tional differences. Even in our litigious age, an analysis that be-
176. 15 u.s.c. § 1 (2000). 
177. See Mark A. Graber, The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty: Legislative Deference to 
the Judiciary, 7 STUD. AM. POL. DEY. 35, 50-53 (1993). 
178. See Republican Platform 2000, http://www.rnclife.org/platformlplatform2000. 
html (last visited Dec. 29, 2004); 2000 Democratic Party Platform, http://www.democrats. 
org/about/2000platform.html (last visited Dec. 29, 2004). 
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gins by examining the main political issues that divide the major 
parties reveals that in 2000 as in 1835 numerous political ques-
tions about public policy are not resolved into constitutional 
questions about the powers of government. 
The political questions resolved into constitutional ques-
tions have not remained static for the past 170 years. The Four-
teenth Amendment provided constitutional language that over 
time has facilitated efforts to resolve what were formerly local 
political or constitutional questions into national constitutional 
questions. Abortion and other issues of family law that raised 
only policy questions in the nineteenth century are now resolved 
into hotly contested constitutional questions. The trend, how-
ever, has not entirely been toward expanding the number of po-
litical questions resolved into constitutional questions. Some im-
portant political questions resolved into constitutional questions 
during the nineteenth century now raise only political questions. 
Antebellum Americans debated whether protective tariffs and 
presidential vetoes on policy grounds were constitutional. Con-
temporary Americans who dispute the merits of trade policies 
and presidential vetoes nevertheless agree that Congress is con-
stitutionally authorized to pass protective tariffs and the presi-
dent is constitutionally authorized to veto legislation for policy 
reasons. 
Examining national party platforms and related documents 
provides important perspectives on judicial output too often ab-
sent in legal or social science analysis. Independent attempts to 
assess the important political questions of an era reveal numer-
ous issues not resolved or only partly resolved into legal or con-
stitutional questions. From the debates over whether to acquire 
Cuba to the debates over the Bush tax cut, Americans have dis-
cussed political questions almost entirely in policy terms, without 
finding constitutional limits on national power. When political 
questions are not resolved into legal or constitutional questions, 
they cannot be further resolved into judicial questions. The 
Rehnquist Court has little authority to impose most Republican 
policy preferences when Democrats control the elected branches 
of government because most conservatives agree that the Consti-
tution does not obligate governing officials to adopt most of the 
proposals laid out in the Contract with America. 
Examination of broader political agendas also suggests that 
the most hotly contested judicial questions of an era are not the 
most hotly contested political questions of that era. The issues 
adjudicated by the Supreme Court in the Charles River Bridge 
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case and United States v. Lopez, 179 while of intense concern to 
court watchers, were not deemed of sufficient importance to be 
mentioned in the party platforms and related documents of their 
time period. Tocqueville and others, evidence from party plat-
forms indicates, are wrong to think that the important political 
questions of any era are resolved into legal or constitutional 
questions. The better conclusion is that persons immersed in the 
study of courts too often attach special importance only to those 
political questions of their times that are resolved into legal 
questions. 
B. CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS INTO 
JUDICIAL QUESTIONS 
The most significant differences between judicial agendas in 
1835 and in 2004 reflect differences in the extent to which consti-
tutional questions are resolved into judicial questions. At pre-
sent, virtually all political questions that are resolved into consti-
tutional questions are further resolved into judicial questions. 
The only two prominent contemporary political issues debated 
primarily in constitutional terms not resolved by the Supreme 
Court have concerned presidential power to send troops abroad 
without a declaration of war and the definition of high crimes 
and misdemeanors necessary to impeach a sitting President. 
During the Jacksonian era, scarcely any constitutional question 
was resolved into a judicial question. The only two prominent 
political issues debated in constitutional terms that came before 
the Supreme Court during the three decades before the Civil 
War were the status of slavery in the territories and the means 
for recapturing fugitive slaves. The other constitutional issues 
considered by the courts were matters of relatively minor politi-
cal interest. 
A remarkable number of constitutional debates took place 
in Jacksonian America that were not put on the agenda of the 
federal courts. Without any assistance from the federal judiciary, 
Congress debated at great length whether the United States 
could annex a foreign country (Texas ). 180 Presidential vetoes of 
numerous American System proposals relied heavily on consti-
tutional arguments that were subsequently not reviewed in 
179. 514 u.s. 549 (1995). 
180. See Mark A. Graber, Settling the West: The Annexation of Texas, Louisiana 
Purchase and Bush v. Gore,"in THE LOUISIANA PURCHASE AND AMERICAN 
EXPANSIONISM (Sanford Levinson & Bartholomew Sparrow eds., forthcoming 2006). 
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court. 181 J acksonians resolved into constitutional questions the 
political questions associated with national economic develop-
ment,182 national expansion,183 executive usurpation, 184 and the 
origins of the Mexican War185 without further resolving these 
constitutional questions into judicial questions. David Currie's 
two volume study of constitutional debates in Congress from 
1828-1860 details in approximately six-hundred pages numerous 
constitutional debates among Jacksonian elected officials, the 
vast majority of which were never placed on the agenda of the 
late Marshall and Taney Courts. 186 
The narrow construction of national power championed by 
Jacksonians in the executive and legislative branches of the na-
tional government explains why some antebellum questions of 
constitutional law were not resolved into judicial questions. Con-
stitutional questions are resolved into judicial questions only 
when government officials adopt or implement constitutionally 
controversial policies. Whigs and Democrats agreed that the 
federal government was not constitutionally obligated to incor-
porate a national bank or finance certain internal improvements. 
Hence, when the federal government failed to adopt those or 
other constitutionally controversial policies, the questions of 
constitutional law debated in Congress could not be resolved 
181. See Andrew Jackson, Veto Message, in 2 MESSAGES AND PAPERS, supra note 
48, at 483-93 (no power to finance local improvements); Andrew Jackson, Veto Message, 
in 2 MESSAGES AND PAPERS, at 576-91 (no power to establish a national bank); John 
Tyler, Veto Message, in 4 MESSAGES AND PAPERS, at 63-72 (no power to incorporate a 
bank); John Tyler, Veto Message, in 4 MESSAGES AND PAPERS, at 330-33 (no power to 
improve navigation of rivers); James K. Polk, Veto Message, in 4 MESSAGES AND 
PAPERS, at 460-66 (no power to construct local improvements); James K. Polk, Veto 
Message, in 4 MESSAGES AND PAPERS, at 610-626 (same); Franklin Pierce, Veto Mes-
sage, in 5 MESSAGES AND PAPERS, at 247-56 (no power to construct hospitals for the 
insane),; id. at 256-71 (no power to make local improvements); Franklin Pierce, Veto 
Message, in 5 MESSAGES AND PAPERS, at 386-88 (no power to make internal improve-
ments); James Buchanan, Veto Message, in 5 MESSAGES AND PAPERS, at 543-50 (no 
power over education); James Buchanan, Veto Message, in 5 MESSAGES AND PAPERS, at 
601-07 (no power to make local improvements); id. at 608-14 (no power to give public 
lands away to settlers). 
182. See Democratic Platform of 1840, in 1 NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS, supra 
note 47, at 1; Democratic Platform of 1844, at 3; Democratic Platform of 1848, at 10; Free 
Soil Platform of 1848, at 14; Democratic Platform of 1852, at 16; Free Democratic Plat-
form of 1852, at 19; Whig Platform of 1852, at 20; Democratic Platform of 1856, at 24; Re-
publican Platform of 1856, at 28; Democratic Platform of 1860, at 30; Democratic 
(Breckenridge Faction) Platform of 1860, at 31; Republican Platform of 1860, at 33. 
183. See WILSON, supra note 51, at 151; PETERSON, supra note 52, at 256. 
184. See COLE, supra note 50, at 206. 
185. See SMITH, supra note 54, at 14; PETERSON, supra note 52, at 225-26; 
BERGERON, supra note 53, at 86. 
186. See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: DEMOCRATS AND 
WHIGS, 1829-1861 (2005). 
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into a lawsuit. 187 A Supreme Court primed to overrule 
McCulloch was denied that opportunity when two national bank 
bills were vetoed by Jacksonian presidents. 
The truncated agenda of the Taney Court also reflects the 
lack of support services for litigation in antebellum America. 
Charles Epp and Susan Lawrence note that constitutional issues 
are frequently resolved into judicial issues only when interest 
groups provide citizens with expert attorneys and other services 
necessary to initiate and maintain litigation. 188 Such services 
were not normally available in Jacksonian America. Northern 
Whigs and their political allies did not sponsor litigation after 
Congress annexed Texas or President Jackson removed federal 
deposits from the national bank. This reticence was partly rooted 
in beliefs that Jacksonian justices were likely to sustain Jackson-
ian politics and that the point of litigation was to win. John C. 
Calhoun and other South Carolinians preferred nullification to 
litigation because they believed that courts would uphold the 
constitutionality of existing tariff policy. 189 Abolitionists were the 
only political activists in Jacksonian America who consistently 
provided support services for litigation and who were willing to 
litigate when the chances of success were limited. The two cases 
decided before the Civil War in which the Taney Court handed 
down rulings on the constitutionality of major national legisla-
tion, Prigg and Dred Scott, were cases in which abolitionists or 
other persons opposed to slavery represented persons of color 
free of charge. 
Events between 1828 and 1860 suggest that elected officials 
consistently limited the judicial agenda by making self-conscious 
decisions not to resolve constitutional questions into judicial 
questions. Dred Scott and Prigg were handed down only after 
the legislature whose laws were under constitutional attack initi-
ated judicial policymaking.190 When, as was the case with inter-
nal improvements and Negro Seamen's Acts, elected officials 
187. See Mark A. Graber, The Jacksonian Origins of the Chase Court, 25 J. SUP. Cf. 
HIST.l7, 34 (2000). 
188. See Charles R. Epp, External Pressure and the Supreme Court's Agenda, in 
SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING: NEW INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACHES 255-79 
(Cornell W. Clayton & Howard Gillman eds., 1999); SUSAN E. LAWRENCE, THE POOR 
IN COURT: THE LEGAL SERVICES PROGRAM AND SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING 
(1990). 
189. See John C. Calhoun, Exposition Reported by the Special Committee, in 10 THE 
PAPERS OF JOHN C. CALHOUN 447 (Clyde N. Wilson &W. Edwin Hemphill ed., 1977). 
190. See DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN 
AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS 206 (1978); SWISHER, supra note 82, at 538. 
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made clear that they preferred legislative and executive solutions 
to hotly contested constitutional questions, 191 the Supreme Court 
stayed out of the political fray. Congress helped prevent consti-
tutional litigation over trade policy by steadfastly refusing to de-
scribe the duty on any good as a protective tariff. 192 The central 
legislative debate during the New Mexicorrexas boundary dis-
pute was whether Congress should draw the boundary line or au-
thorize a lawsuit that would require the Supreme Court to draw 
the boundary line. After much debate, the legislative option was 
chosen. No litigation followed even though the issue was theo-
retically justiciable.193 Although far more research on the politi-
cal construction of the judicial agenda is necessary, the Jackson-
ian experience suggests that judicial review during the three 
decades before the Civil War took place by legislative invitation 
only. 
Antebellum barriers to constitutional litigation have largely 
been removed. Every political coalition that dominated the na-
tional government after the Civil War has had a far more expan-
sive notion of national power than did Jacksonian Democrats. 194 
The more frequently the national government passes constitu-
tionally controversial proposals, the more frequently such consti-
tutional questions are resolved into judicial questions. The Four-
teenth Amendment, in particular, eased the process by which 
constitutional questions are resolved into judicial questions. Be-
fore the Civil War, constitutional questions could rarely be re-
solved into national judicial questions when the national gov-
ernment rejected a constitutionally controversial policy. 195 When 
the federal government elected not to ban antislavery speech, 
the possibility of resolving that constitutional question into a ju-
dicial question was foreclosed. Once the vast majority of provi-
sions in the Bill of Rights were incorporated, constitutional is-
sues could be adjudicated in federal courts whenever one of the 
fifty states adopted the constitutionally controversial proposal. 
The Supreme Court decided whether states could prohibit mar-
ried couples from using birth control196 at a time when forty-
~ight states had rejected that constitutionally controversial pol-
Icy. 
191. Searight v. Stokes, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 151, 158 (1845) (argument of Nelson, 
A. G.); SWISHER, supra note 82, at 393-94. 
192. See Calhoun, supra note 189, at 447. 
193. See SMITH, supra note 54, at 103, 173-74. 
194. Graber, supra note 187, at 34. 
195. See id. 
196. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
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The substantial support structure for constitutional litiga-
tion that developed after the Civil War further eased the process 
by which constitutional questions were resolved into judicial 
questions. Jeremiah Black and other prominent Democrats fa-
cilitated litigation attacking Reconstruction measures by provid-
ing pro bono services to southerners imprisoned under martial 
law. Conservative legal groups provided the attorneys in cases 
challenging the constitutionality of progressive labor legislation. 
At present, such organizations as the American Civil Liberties 
Union, National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
People, and Washington Defense Fund ensure that persons with 
certain kinds of constitutional claims have the wherewithal to 
litigate. Paula Jones was able to sue President Clinton because 
the President's enemies financed her lawsuit. The probability of 
losing is no longer always a disincentive to litigation. Many con-
temporary interest groups are perfectly willing to fund lawsuits 
that have little chance of legal success when litigation is likely to 
bring favorablX publicity and other benefits to their broader po-
litical causes. 19 
Elected officials after the Civil War consistently facilitated 
judicial resolution of pressing constitutional and political contro-
versies. Republican legislative majorities in 1875 and in 1891 
substantially expanded federal jurisdiction in order to ensure 
that the main legal and constitutional questions raised by the 
new industrial order would be resolved by a federal court system 
largely staffed with Republican appointees. 198 Congress at the 
turn of the twentieth century repeatedly passed vague laws that 
compelled judicial policymaking in the guise of statutory inter-
pretation on such issues as antitrust and labor law. 199 Such self-
conscious statutory ambiguities explain much present litiga-
tion?00 Scot Powe details how liberals in the Kennedy and John-
son administrations helped create the Warren Court through a 
197. See McCANN, supra note 34. Willingness to lose has limits. Fearful of a judicial 
decision dramatically limiting the use of race in employment decisions, proponents of 
affirmative action paid more than $300,000 to settle Sharon Taxman's unlawful dismissal 
suit against the Piscataway School District. See Brendan M. Lee, The Argument for Fac-
ulty Diversity: Recommendations after Taxman v. Board of Education, 27 STETSON L. 
REV. 739,743 (1997). 
198. See Howard Gillman, How Political Parties Can Use the Courts to Advance their 
Agendas: Federal Courts in the United States, 1875-1891, 96 AMER. POL. SCI. REV. 511 
(2002). 
199. See GEORGE I. LOVELL, LEGISLATIVE DEFERRALS: STATUTORY AMBIGUITY, 
JUDICIAL POWER, AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2003). supra? 
200. See, e.g., MARTIN SHAPIRO, WHO GUARDS THE GUARDIANS: JUDICIAL 
CONTROL OF AD.'VIINISTRATION (1988). 
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combination of judicial appointments and federal support for 
constitutional litigation.201 Recent Republican Presidents have 
used a similar combination of judicial appointments and litiga-
tion strategies when seeking to have constitutional questions re-
solved into judicial questions and then resolved favorably. 202 
The license Congress granted to the Supreme Court during 
the 1850s for determining the constitutional status of slavery in 
the territories is now routinely issued to federal courts for resolv-
ing a wide range of political and constitutional questions. Not 
every instance of contemporary judicial policymaking can be 
matched with a specific legislative invitation. Still, the generally 
supportive political climate for constitutional adjudication pro-
motes judicial activism. Jacksonian Justices presumed they were 
not to make major constitutional decisions unless explicitly in-
vited to do so by members of the dominant national coalition. 
The ubiquity of such invitations at present suggests that contem-
porary Justices feel free to make major constitutional decisions 
unless a united majority coalition plainly indicates that judicial 
intervention is not wanted. 
V. TOCQUEVILLE, CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT, AND JUDICIAL 
DECISIONMAKING REVISITED 
The Jacksonian failure to resolve national political ques-
tions into national judicial questions is remarkable. Proof that 
some national political questions were not resolved into judicial 
questions would be important given the constant quotation of 
Tocqueville's thesis in contemporary public law scholarship. 
That scarcely any national political question not involving slav-
ery was resolved into a national judicial question in Toc-
queville's time is stunning. The textual and extratextual evidence 
indicates that Tocqueville was referring to the Supreme Court of 
the United States when he made his famous pronouncement. 
Contemporary commentators who cite his thesis assert that po-
litical questions in the United States are "invariably" resolved 
into constitutional questions. Nevertheless, Tocqueville's thesis 
bears no resemblance to Jacksonian national politics, even when 
201. See LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 
(2000); see also Howard Gillman, Constitutional Law as Partisan Entrenchment: The Po-
litical Origins of Liberal Judicial Activism, in THE SUPREME COURT AND AMERICAN 
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT (Ronald Kahn & Ken Kersch eds., forthcoming 2005). 
202. See Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revo-
lution, 87 VA. L. REV. 1045, 1076 (2001). 
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political questions that everyone knows are not resolved into ju-
dicial questions are excluded from the analysis. The Taney Court 
before the Civil War handed down no major decision on national 
economic development, national expansion, or any matter other 
than slavery that excited Jacksonian political actors. The Jack-
sonian judicial agenda was severely truncated even though the 
Justices theoretically had little power to control their docket. 
The judicial power to deny a writ of certiorari, which contempo-
rary scholars believe is the most imEortant means by which the 
Supreme Court's agenda is limited, 3 did not exist before 1925. 
Lack of resources, which prevented some constitutional issues 
from being litigated, hardly explains why Nicholas Biddle and 
the lawyers he retained did not judicially challenge President 
Jackson's decision to remove government deposits from the na-
tional bank. 
The flaws in Tocqueville's thesis are a pointed reminder 
that the study of American political and constitutional develop-
ment cannot be reduced to the study of American constitutional 
law. The common claim that "[r]eading through an American 
constitutional law text is like walking through modern human 
existence in an afternoon" horribly distorts American politics 
(and human existence)?04 Readers of the most comprehensive 
constitutional law casebook possible would learn hardly any-
thing about the Mexican War, the annexation of Texas, virtually 
all issues associated with national economic development, the 
dawn of national political parties, the rise of white republicanism 
(though the "white" element would be communicated by Dred 
Scott), Manifest Destiny, and the advent of the popular presi-
dency. That comprehensive casebook would not even be an ade-
quate guide to constitutional developments during the three dec-
ades before the Civil War. The political questions associated 
with national economic development and national expansion, in 
particular, were resolved into constitutional questions during the 
second party system. J acksonians simply did not further resolve 
those constitutional questions into judicial questions. One con-
sequence of the persistent tendency to conflate American consti-
tutionalism and American constitutional law is that few Ameri-
can constitutionalists are aware of the debates over the 
203. H.W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING To DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED 
STATES SUPREME COURT 11 (1991); RICHARD L. PACELLE, JR., THE TRANSFORMATION 
OF THE SUPREME COURT'S AGENDA: FROM THE NEW DEAL TO THE REAGAN 
ADMINISTRATION 1-14 (1991). 
204. SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 24, at 4 (quoting Bertha Wilson). 
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American System and national expansion during the 1830s and 
1840s, much less the constitutional principles that were em-
ployed to justify and discredit federal promotion of national 
economic development and Manifest Destiny. 
Scholarship exploring constitutional decisionmaking outside 
the courts will thrive once American constitutionalists acknowl-
edge how many constitutional questions have not been resolved 
into judicial questions. Because the present division of academic 
labor assigns constitutional questions exclusively to academic 
lawyers and political scientists who study courts, previous un-
thinking acceptance of Tocqueville's thesis has inhibited scholar-
ship on the numerous constitutional questions that were debated 
and resolved almost entirely within legislative settings. Elected 
officials are recofonized to have constitutional dialogues with po-
litical officials,20 but only Donald Morgan, Keith Whittington, 
Michael Kent Curtis, and Susan Burgess point out that elected 
officials frequently perform constitutional solos. 206 Constitu-
tional scholars more conscious of the numerous constitutional 
issues that arise, are debated, and settled outside of courts can 
begin exploring the details of those controversies, the extent to 
which the structure of constitutional debate outside the courts 
mirrors or differs from the structure of constitutional debate in-
side the courts, any changes in either the scope or nature of con-
stitutional debates outside the courts, and the causes of those 
changes. 
Persons studying judicial decisionmaking after the demise of 
Tocqueville's thesis must abandon common claims that political 
questions are easily translated into constitutional questions and 
that judicial preferences determine what political questions oc-
cupy the most space on the judicial agenda. Chief Justice Taney 
had a strong preference against the national bank.207 Justice Ca-
205. See LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES: INTERPRETATION AS 
POLITICAL PROCESS (1988); LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN 
CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT (4th ed. 1997); JOHN J. DINAN, KEEPING THE 
PEOPLE'S LIBERTIES: LEGISLATORS, CITIZENS AND JUDGES AS GUARDIANS OF 
RIGHTS (1998); Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577 
(1993). 
206. KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED 
POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING (1999); SUSAN R. BURGESS, CONTEST FOR 
CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY: THE ABORTION AND WAR POWERS DEBATES (1991); 
DONALD G. MORGAN, CONGRESS AND THE CONSTITUTION: A STUDY OF 
RESPONSIBILITY (1966); MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, "THE PEOPLE'S 
DARLING PRIVILEGE": STRUGGLES FOR FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN AMERICAN 
HISTORY (2000). 
207. See SWISHER, supra note 82, at 176-77, 180-81, 189-93, 218-19, 228, 230-32, 258, 
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tron had a strong preference for resettling Native Americans.208 
Justice Story had a strong preference against annexing Texas.209 
Justice McLean had a strong preference for excluding the Ea-
tons from proper society.210 None of these justices officially acted 
on these preferences. Jacksonians who had strong political pref-
erences about whether to have a naval academy or fight a war 
with France refrained from translating their political preferences 
into constitutional preferences. Such hotly debated constitu-
tional questions as whether the federal government had the 
power to finance internal improvements or annex Texas were 
never resolved into judicial questions. The resulting lack of 
relevant cases meant that Justices during the three decades be-
fore the Civil War were not free to make decisions on any of the 
most politically salient matters on the Jacksonian agenda. Slav-
ery aside, the constitutional agenda of the Taney Court was 
dominated by relatively unimportant contract and dormant 
commerce clause cases because those were the only matters that 
existing constitutional arguments and political practices permit-
ted to be resolved into judicial questions. 
The predominant forms of legal and constitutional argu-
ment in Jacksonian America did not permit many political ques-
tions to be translated easily and persuasively into questions of 
constitutional law. Jacksonians lacked any good way to say in 
constitutional English that Thomas Hart Benton should have 
been made a lieutenant general during the Mexican War or that 
cabinet spouses should have treated Margaret Eaton as a social 
equal. These antebellum rhetorical practices confirm important 
work on how existing forms of legal argument structure judicial 
output. Philip Bobbitt has identified six legitimate constitutional 
modalities, constitutional logics that have historically shaped 
constitutional decisions.211 Mark Richards ar.d Herbert Kritzer 
are documenting how "jurisprudential regimes structure Su-
preme Court decision making by establishing which case factors 
are relevant for decision making and/or by setting the level of 
333-334. 
208. See Frank Otto GatcH, John Catron, in 1 THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED 
STATES SUPREME COURT 1789-1978: THEIR LIVES AND MAJOR OPINIONS 740-43 (Leon 
Friedman & Fred L. Israel cds., 1980). 
209. See 1 WILLIAM WETMORE STORY, THE LIFE AND LETTERS OF JOSEPH STORY 
481,509-10,513-14 (1971). 
210. See FRANCIS P. WEISENBURGER, THE LIFE OF JOHN MCLEAN: A POLITICIAN 
ON THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT73 (1971). 
21 I. See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE 
CONSTITUTION (1982) PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1991 ). 
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scrutiny or balancing the justices are to employ in assessing case 
factors. "212 These regimes, Richards and Kritzer conclude, sig-
nificantly limit judicial capacity to translate policy preferences 
into constitutional preferences.213 The Jacksonian experience 
calls for further scholarship examining whether similar or differ-
ent modalities of constitutional argument or jurisprudential re-
gimes explain why elected officials, as well as Justices, do not 
automatically resolve political questions into constitutional ques-
tions. 
These modalities or regimes are not timeless. Protective tar-
iffs were thought to raise constitutional questions only in Jack-
sonian America. The presidential veto power was thought to 
raise constitutional questions before, but not after, the Civil 
War. Family law was not constitutionalized until the twentieth 
century. Why these changes took place is still largely a constitu-
tional mystery. Changes in interest group politics, most notably 
the rise of the women's movement, help explain why abortion 
now raises significant constitutional questions. Constitutional 
rhetoric in other areas of constitutional law is more autonomous. 
Constitutional questions associated with the tariff were settled 
sometime in the late nineteenth century, even though political 
debate over trade policy has been an enduring feature of Ameri-
can politics. 
The Jacksonian constitutional experience demonstrates how 
substantive political choices constrain judicial policymaking. 
Constitutional questions are not resolved into judicial questions 
whenever elected officials reject constitutionally controversial 
policies. The Taney Court did not determine whether the na-
tional government could incorporate a bank because the na-
tional government did not incorporate a bank while that tribunal 
sat. Had judicial passivity been merely a cover for agreement 
with the policies made by the elected branches of government, as 
some judicial behavioralists assume,214 National Republi-
can/Whig justices should have insisted that the federal govern-
ment adopt American System proposals. No such decision was 
handed down during the three decades before the Civil War or 
at any other time in American history. Justices who regarded a 
212. Mark J. Richards & Herbert M. Kritzer, Jurisprudential Regimes in Supreme 
Court Decision Making, 96 AMER. PoL. SCI. REV. 305, 305 (2002); Herbert M. Kritzer & 
Mark J. Richards, Jurisprudential Regimes and Supreme Court Decisionmaking: The 
Lemon Regime and Establishment Clause Cases, 37 LAW & Soc. REV. 827 (2003). 
213. See Richards & Kritzer, supra note 212, at 312-16. 
214. See SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 24, at 305. 
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national bank as constitutionally legitimate and good policy re-
garded governmental decisions not to incorporate a bank as bad, 
but constitutionally legitimate, policy. 
This significant limit on judicial power continues to con-
strain constitutional adjudication. While some Justices opposed 
to capital punishment have struck down legislative efforts to 
mandate death as a punishment for crime,215 no Justice who fa-
vored capital punishment has ever overturned a legislative re-
fusal to mandate death as a punishment for crime. This point 
may seem obvious. Nevertheless, the remarkable number of in-
fluential studies that insist Justices are "untrammeled policy 
makers" imply that Whig Justices should have insisted the na-
tional government incorporate a national bank, progressive Jus-
tices should have compelled all states to adopt maximum hour 
laws, and contemporary conservative Justices will insist that all 
states adopt the death penalty. Contrary to this logic, law mat-
ters when elected officials refuse to adopt constitutionally con-
troversial policies. The Rehnquist Court has no more power than 
the Marshall or Taney Courts to correct legislative or executive 
decisions based on what a judicial majority believes is an unduly 
narrow conception of federal or state power. 
The constitutional politics of the Jacksonian Era highlight 
the political foundations of judicial review. Public law scholar-
ship tends to regard elected officials as the persons primarily re-
sponsible for establishing judicial review in most countries. 
"[W]hen their policy preferences have been, or are likely to be, 
increasingly challenged in majoritarian decision-making arenas," 
Ran Hirschi observes in his important study of judicial power in 
Israel, South Africa, Canada, New Zealand, "elites that possess 
disproportionate access to, and influence over, the legal arena 
may initiate a constitutional entrenchment of rights and judicial 
review in order to transfer power to supreme courts."216 Elected 
officials played a similar role establishing judicial power in the 
antebellum United States. Section 25 of the Judiciary Act, which 
authorized the justices to declare federal and state laws unconsti-
tutional, was at least as responsible for establishing judicial re-
view as Marbury v. Madison. 217 The Jacksonian decision not to 
215. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 227-31 (1976) (Brennan J., dissenting), 
Gregg, at 231-41 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1143-59 (1994) 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
216. RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY: THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES 
OF THE NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM (2004). 
217. See Mark A. Graber, Establishing Judicial Review: Marbury and The Judiciary 
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repeal that provision was more crucial to the maintenance of 
that power than any decision by the Taney Court.218 Dred Scott 
was decided by legislative invitation. When no invitation for ju-
dicial review was issued, no judicial activism was forthcoming. 
The political foundations for judicial review in Jacksonian 
America that cast doubt on Tocqueville's thesis also belie Alex-
ander Bickel's equally famous assertion that when "the Supreme 
Court declares unconstitutional a legislative act ... , it thwarts 
the will of the representatives of the actual people of the here 
and now."219 The Taney Court never made a countermajori-
tarian decision. No decision handed down by that tribunal in-
validated legislation favored by the dominant national coalition. 
The Taney Court before the Civil War never even issued a ruling 
on the constitutionality of any important federal legislation 
unless the litigation was promoted by members of the dominant 
national coalition. Judicial politics is more complicated today. 
Still, the causes of the increased tendency for constitutional 
questions to be resolved into judicial questions, legislation ex-
panding federal jurisdiction, the appointment and confirmation 
of justices committed to declaring certain laws unconstitutional, 
and extensive litigation campaigns sponsored in part by the fed-
eral government, belie a simply countermajoritarian interpreta-
tion of judicial power. A countermajoritarian difficulty that does 
not remotely describe the relationship between elected officials 
and the Supreme Court when Tocqueville was writing or at pre-
sent is a poor vehicle for evaluating that relationship. 
Act of 1789, 38 TULSA L. REV. 609 (2003) 
218. See Warren, supra note 164. 
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